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CHAPTER I; INTRODUCTION 
The Serrano v. Priest Decision 
The early part of the decade of the 1970's has been marked by a 
flurry of lawsuits across the United States questioning the constitu­
tionality of fiscal systems currently in use for funding elementary and 
secondary education. Present interpretation of the United States Con­
stitution places the responsibility for education with the individual 
state. Most states today have some sort of school finance system drawing 
revenues heavily from local property taxes. 
Educational finance has long been considered an area of inçortance, 
interest and controversy. Ellwood P. Cubberly, an early writer on edu­
cational finance, felt it of primary importance. In 1906, Cubberly wrote: 
One of the most important administrative problems of today is how 
properly to finance the school systems of a state, as the question ^  
of sufficient revenue lies back of almost every other problem. . . . 
This attitude holds today. The basis of the constitutionality lawsuits, 
which numbered 37 in 2h states as of March 1, 1972, is the relation 
between Cubberly*s "sufficient revenue" and "other problems. 
More specifically, the typical educational finance litigation of the 
early 1970's questioned the constitutionality of a fiscal system on the 
^Ellwood P. Cubberly, School Funds and Their Apportionment (Hew York: 
Teachers College, Columbia University, 1906), p. 3. 
^See Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, "Committee 
Report," Report No. 9, (Washington, D.C. : The Committee, March, 1972). 
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grounds that the system, as it functions, denies equal educational oppor­
tunity to certain groups of students. This is not a nev criticism. 
Cubherly recognized the possibility of such a problem and expressed con­
cern over disparities in educational opportunity. He noted; 
Theoretically, all children of the state are equally important and 
are entitled to have the same advantages; practically this can never 
be quite true. The duty of the state is to secure for all as high a 
minimum of good instruction as is possible, but not to reduce mi to 
this minimum; to equalize the advantages to all as nearly as can be 
done with the resources at hand. . . ? 
Thus, the allocation of funds for educational purposes has, in addition 
to the constraint of limited funds, an implicit constraint that the dis­
tribution be deemed socially equitable. 
Most significant educational finance litigations of the early 1970's 
were based heavily on precedent set by the California Supreme Court in 
Serrano v. Priest.^ The case was brought by plaintiffs, school children 
and parents from a number of Los Angeles school districts sigainst defen­
dants, county and state officials in charge of administering the school 
finance system of California. 
The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the California system of edu­
cational finance was in violation of the equal protection clauses of both 
the California and United States Constitutions. By making the generation 
of revenue for funding local schools a primary responsibility of the local 
district, the State of California has made the amount of money spent per 
child vary widely among districts, the plaintiffs claimed. This wide 
^Cubberly, School Funds and Their Apportionment, p. 17. 
^Serrano, et al v. Priest, et aL, California Supreme Court, August 30, 
1971. 
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spending variation results from disparities in ability and willingness 
of local districts to tax themselves. Property tax revenue is the basic 
source of school funding in California, as in most states. 
In the action brought by the plaintiffs, three separate allegations 
were made. First, the amount of money a district can spend was alleged 
to be a function of the property tax base of the district and the willing­
ness of the district constituents to tax themselves. Second, property 
wealth per student was alleged to be distributed non-homogeneously among 
districts. 
These two allegations form one basis of the complaint. If spending 
per pupil is taken as a proxy for educational opportunity, and if spending 
per pupil bears a positive relation to property values per pupil, educa­
tional opportunity depends on the geographic location of the child's 
residence. A child in a rich district has a greater educational oppor­
tunity than a child in a district which is poor in terms of property 
wealth. 
The final allegation was that taxpayers in low property value dis­
tricts were unable to provide their children with an equal education. 
Only by its taxing property at a rate higher than a more wealthy district 
can a poor district spend the same amount per student as the more wealthy 
district. The higher tax rates necessary for such a program would, in 
many cases, be prohibitive for the constituents of the poor district.^ 
A three-part opinion was offered by the California Supreme Court. 
The analysis by the court followed very closely the argument presented by 
5Ibid.. 20-24. 
k 
Coons, Clune and Sugarman in their recent book on educational opportu­
nity.® This analysis is based on the legal concept of "new equal pro­
tection," as explained by Kenneth Karst, Professor of Law at the Univer-
7 
sity of California. 
Karst explains the concept basically as follows: all laws classify 
people into various categories. Prior to certain civil rights cases 
(dealing primarily with integration and poll taxes), the only test of con­
stitutionality for a classification brought about by a law was ratio­
nality. If a law has a rational basis for classification, it was consid­
ered constitutional. 
The new concept of equal protection consists of three ideas. If a 
law, by the classification it creates, discriminates against a funda­
mental interest of a group, the law must be based on a compelling state 
g 
interest rather than just being rational to remain constitutional. The 
Court has to determine if (a) discrimination resulted from the property 
tax financing of schools, (b) if a fundamental interest of the group being 
discriminated against was involved, and (c) if a compelling state interest 
existed that would justify the law given that (a) and (b) were true. 
Initially, the California Supreme Court addressed the question of 
^John E. Coons, William H. Clune, III, and Stephen Sugarman, Private 
Wealth and Public Education (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1970). 
Y 
Kenneth Karst, "Description of the Litigation in Serrano v. Priest," 
in Serrano v. Priest: Implications for Equal Educational Opportunity, ed. 
by J. Scribner (Los Angeles: U.C.L.A. Education Extension, 1971)• 
^Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
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whether or not education is a fundamental interest of the individual.^ 
In an eloquent essay on the value of education to the individual and to 
society, the Court concluded that education is a fundamental interest of 
the individual in American society today. Five primary reasons were 
cited. Education is necessary for equality of economic opportunity. 
Everyone needs education. It is a governmental service that extends over 
a long period of time. The state ranks it high enough in importance to 
make attendance compulsory. Finally, education is "unmatched in the 
extent to which it molds the personality of the youth of society. 
Discrimination, in such a case, is dependent on the fondamental 
interest being distributed among groups on the "basis of a suspect classi­
fication. A suspect classification is a classification which categorizes 
groups or individuals on the basis of a descriptive parameter which should 
have no relevance to the classification. A ludicrous exaaçle would be 
giving all red-haired people life prison sentences. Wealth, race and 
religious ethic are exaz^les of suspect classifications. 
By studying expenditure and property value patterns among California 
school districts, the Court determined that expenditures per pupil were 
positively related to property wealth per pupil. Examples were readily 
evident in which a district with a low assessed value per pupil could 
spend the same as a neighboring district with high assessed value only by 
taxing itself at a rate several times as high as the more "wealtay district.^ 
o 
Serrano v. Priest,. 33-^5. 
^°Ibid.. U. 
^^Ibid., 20-21. 
6 
state equalization aid did not make up for the differences in fiscal 
capacity. Certain aspects of the California grants system actually con-
12 
tained biases which were disequalizing rather than equalizing. 
The Court concluded that the State of California, by devising the 
arbitrary boundaries of school districts which varied in property value 
per student, and by designing a fiscal system to fund elementary and 
secondary education that was primarily based on school district property 
taxes, had been an active agent in causing discrimination. Wealth in the 
form of property values was the distinguishing feature among the groups. 
Groups of students in low property value districts were, as a result of 
this state in^osed categorization based on a suspect classification, being 
denied equal access to education—a fundamental interest. 
After such a conclusion, the Court had to address the question of 
whether or not a conçelling state interest existed to justify the exist­
ence of such a discriminatory fiscal system. As a compelling state 
interest, defense council presented the argument that the system had been 
designed to encourage local responsibility. Decentralization, the defense 
contended, would foster efficiency in decision making. Thus, efficiency 
in local district administration was the state's conçelling interest for 
retention of the fiscal system. 
This argument was broken down into two conç>onents by the Court. 
Local administration of schools regarding educational policy matters 
(hiring, dismissal, educational offerings, etc.) is one aspect of local 
12 
'^Ibid., 17-19. 
^^Ibid., U5. 
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decision making. The second aspect is that the local district can decide 
how much it wishes to spend per child. 
Local educational policy administration need not in any way be 
affected by the fiscal system used to fund the school, according to the 
Court. The Court asserted that, indeed, local officials were in the best 
position for this sort of decision making. The financing system cannot 
be considered necessary for this aspect of local responsibility.^^ 
According to the defense, allowing a district to choose how much it 
wishes to spend enables the district to tailor its tax-expenditure pattern 
to the desires of the local community. The Court, citing an example of a 
poor district which, at an equal tax rate, is only able to spend half as 
much as a more wealthy district, refused to accept the defense argument. 
In answer, it said "... such fiscal freewill is (but) a cruel illusion 
for the poor school districts.The actual choice of level of expen­
ditures is available only to those districts with a relatively large 
fiscal capacity. In terms of tax rate as a measure of effort, poor dis­
tricts have to put forth maximum effort to provide minimal offerings under 
the California fiscal system. 
The Situation 
Practically all of the major school finance litigation in the United 
States in this decade has been based on the Serrano v. Priest precedent. 
The basic rulings of Serrano v. Priest can be summed up by one statement: 
the quality of a child's education cannot be restricted by the wealth of 
^^Ibid.. h6. 
^^Ibid.. 47. 
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the school district in which he resides. This is the definition of fiscal 
neutrality of educational finance as interpreted by the California Supreme 
Court. Unless otherwise noted, use of the term, neutrality, refers to 
this concept. 
A case entitled Eodriguez v. San Antonio, "based heavily on the 
Serrano precedent, vas filed in the U.S. District Court of the Western 
District of Texas.The plea of the plaintiffs was upheld by the Court. 
Upon appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the lower court decision was over­
turned by a five to four vote. Justice Lewis F. Powell, speaking for the 
majority, said, "It is not the province of this court to create substan­
tive constitutional right in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of 
the laws. Education ... is not among the rights afforded explicit pro­
tection under our Constitution, nor do we find any basis for saying it is 
17 implicitly so protected." 
The Supreme Court had not ruled on the case by studying the question 
of discrimination alleged to exist by the plaintiffs. It had ruled that 
education was not protected as a fundamental right of the individual. 
Thus, the criterion for application of the "new equal protection" concept 
was not met. Since equal protection under the law requires only ratio­
nality for a law to be constitutional, this ruling meant that the existing 
property tax financing in most states was constitutional. 
An attack on the decision had been anticipated but not the nature of 
^^Rodriguez v. San Antonio, U.S. District Court of the Western Dis­
trict of Texas, 1971. 
17 
Associated Press, "High Court Upholds Property Tax for Financing of 
Schools," Pes Moines Register, March 22, 1973, p. 2. 
9 
the ruling of the Supreme Court. Initial reaction ammig proponents of the 
Serrano v. Priest type of reform vas one of disbelief, then shock. Roy 
Wilkins, Executive Director of the National Association for the Advance­
ment of Colored People, assailed the U.S. Supreme Court for taking a step 
back toward social inequality.•*- Education associations across the nation 
cried out that the Court had delayed equal access to educational oppor­
tunity for years to ccme.^^ 
After the initial reaction of dismay, school finance reformers began 
to realize that the fight was not lost, but the location had changed. The 
fight had been dunçed back in the laps of the states. The decision in 
California was based on the California Constitution. Michigan also had 
had a similar State Supreme Court ruling. Since the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruling on Rodriguez v. San Antonio, the New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled 
that New Jersey's school finance system violates the New Jersey Constitu­
tion. The Oregon and Utah state legislatures have passed reform legisla­
tion, and groups in many states are moving litigation from federal to 
20 
state courts. 
The Problem 
Continued educational finance activity after the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruling provides evidence of the deep interest in an equitable system of 
1 8 
Roy Wilkins, "Inequality Wins in Court," Pes Moines Register. 
April 2, 1973, p. l6. 
^^"ISEA Assails School-Aid Rule," Des Moines Register, March 23, 
1973, p. 2h. 
20 
"School Finance Reform Isn't Dead," (editorial), Pes Moines 
Register, April l6, 1973, p. 16. 
10 
financing education in the United States. However, the continued use of 
the Serrano v. Priest precedent, with its emphasis on dollar expenditures 
could yield undesirable problems. These problems are found in the assump­
tions made by the California Supreme Court and adopted by most courts 
following the Serrano v. Priest precedent. The assumptions constituted 
the expected line of attack on the Serrano logic which the U.S. Supreme 
Court failed to pursue. 
The hypothesis that diminished financing damages the quality of 
school education was accepted at face value by the California Court. 
In studying the complaints of the plaintiffs j the Court used unadjusted 
per pupil expenditure and unadjusted per pupil assessed valuation as 
primary variables of analysis. By utilizing such gross dollar figures, 
by assuming a positive relationship between quality and spending, and by 
not reviewing possible alternate concepts of educativaal opportunity, the 
California Supreme Court has implicitly equated educational opportunity 
with educational expenditure. 
Educational expenditure per pupil may be a valid proxy for educa­
tional opportunity. It is, however, a relatively unsophisticated measure. 
David Kirp, in a critique of Arthur Wise's article, "The Constitutional 
22 Challenge to Inequalities in School Finance" (an early argument of the 
Serrano type), says that this argument gives "... insufficient attention 
^^Serrano v. Priest, 26. 
Arthur Wise, "The Constitutional Challenge to Inequalities in School 
Finance," Phi Delta Kappan, November, 19^9, pp. l4$-k8. 
11 
oo 
to the complexities of defining equality. ..." 'When one studies the 
implicit assumptions of the Serrano argument, the strength of Kirp's 
criticism becomes more evident. Educational, economic and sociological 
factors could cause disparities "between educational expenditure and edu­
cational opportunity, regardless of the definition of the latter. 
Utilizing per pupil expenditure as a criterion of equality requires 
homogeneity assumptions about many descriptive parameters of pu'blic school 
districts. For example, its use requires one to assume that the quality 
of the educational process is equivalent in any two schools spending the 
• same amount of money per student. It assumes that there is no need varia­
tion resulting from student sociological characteristics, that is to say, 
there is no more money required to educate a ghetto student than a student 
from a middle-class suburb, and it assumes there are no economies of scale 
resulting from district size or school plant size. 
The combined effects of school process quality variations, need 
variations due to socioeconomic status of the student population, and cost 
variations due to district size or non-quality factors could make the 
application of the "money spent per pupil equals quality" criterion of 
Serrano v. Priest questionable. It is possible to conceptualize certain 
types of cost which, although normally included in per pupil expenditure, 
do not affect the quality of a child's education. For example, in many 
states transportation costs, which are large in rural districts, are 
I 
included in per pupil expenditure. Transportation costs are necessary 
expenditures of rural districts, but are not directly related to the 
^%)avid Kirp, "A Critique of Wise's Thesis," Phi Delta Kappan, 
November, 19^9, pp. l48-$l. 
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^^David Kirp, "A Critique of Wise's Thesis," Phi Delta Kappan, 
November, I969, pp. l48-$l. 
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quality of education in those districts. 
Age composition of the student population could cause per pupil 
expenditure to vary for a given quality education. High school students 
are more expensive to educate than elementary or middle school students. 
Schools with relatively large elementary and middle school populations 
should have lower per pupil costs than schools with large concentrations 
of high school students, assuming quality constant. 
Variables which could indicate and/or affect quality could also show 
large variation. Breadth of course offerings often varies widely among 
school districts with nearly equal expenditure patterns. Pupil-teacher 
and pupil-professional ratios tend to vary more with size of school than 
with per pupil expenditure. 
Use of the Serrano v. Priest criterion in^licitly assumes that low 
expenditure by a district indicates low quality of educational offering 
and therefore, high educational need of that district. Educational need, 
however vague the concept may be, undoubtedly varies among districts. The 
Illinois Supreme Court ruled in the case of Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, that edu­
cational need was too vague a concept to use as a sole basis for aid dis-
2h tribution. The U.S. Supreme Court concurred in a summary opinion. If 
low spending levels were indicative of need, it is doubtful that these 
rulings would have been made. Today, however, educational finance litera­
ture is stressing the importance of needs estimation in educational 
finance. "The number of dollars spent on education should be based on the 
^^Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 37 U.S.L.W. 3350 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1969). 
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educational needs of the children rather than the wealth of the district, 
The spirit of the Serrano decision, that educational quality cannot 
be limited by wealth, is in accord with the enghasis on needs as determi­
nant of funding found in current literature. The use of unadjusted per 
pupil expenditure as a proxy for educational quality obscures this need 
emphasis. Needs are a function of characteristics of the client popula­
tion. Using this sort of measure, two districts with different needs, as 
determined by student characteristics, would have "equal educational 
opportunity" if they had equal expenditure. 
If a measure of educational opportunity more refined than unadjusted 
per pupil expenditure can be developed, such a measure can be utilized to 
design fiscal systems for financing elementary and secondary education 
which conform to the Serrano v. Priest decision. Educational opportunity 
should not be restricted by school district wealth. The en^hasis, however, 
should be on opportunity rather than expenditure. 
Need for Study 
July 1, 1972, Iowa officially inçlemented a foundation program for 
financing elementary and secondary education. This is the fourth school 
financing system under which Iowa has operated in the last five years.^7 
House File the newly implemented Iowa law, is similar in concept and 
^^National Educational Finance Project, Future Directions for School 
Financing (Gainesville, Florida; National Educational Finance Project, 
1971), p. 8. 
26 
House File 6$%, Iowa 6Uth General Assembly, June 30, 1971• 
^^lowa Code, School Aid Laws, 1966-72. 
l4 
form to the California lav found unconstitutionsil in the Serrano v. Priest 
case. A case "based on Serrano v. Priest could possibly be brought under 
the Iowa Constitution. 
Following Serrano v. Priest precedent and ignoring cost and quality-
variations among districts could increase equality of educational oppor­
tunity. However, the use of an unsophisticated mesisure, such as per pupil 
expenditure, as a proxy for educational opportunity could have adverse 
effects. Programs that use this measure, and conform to the letter of the 
Serrano case, could violate the spirit of the law if they simply equalize 
expenditures and if expenditures are not good proxies of educational 
opportunity. 
Proposal 
This paper proposes to study educational finance in Iowa. Evalu­
ation of the assumptions of Serrano v. Priest will be undertaken. An 
analysis of the current school finance law. House File 65^, will point out 
problems in the existing fiscal structure. A step toward refining the 
relation between educational expenditure and educational opportunity will 
be taken by studying the relations among cost, quality and district size 
in Iowa. Programs conforming to the letter of the Serrano v. Priest 
criterion that expenditures not be limited by wealth will be evaluated, 
through the use of simulations models, in light of the spirit of the 
decision that educational oppoi-tunities not be limited by factors such as 
wealth, race or religious ethic. Finally, a program based on a more 
refined concept of educational opportunity will be designed and simulated. 
The overall aim is to generate information about the relevant parameters 
15 
to be considered in devising an equitable fiscal structure to finance 
public education at the elementary and secondary levels. 
16 
CHAPTER II: FOUNDATION PROGRAMS AND FISCAL NEUTRALITY 
The fiscal neutrality concept of the Serrano v. Priest decision 
underlies much of the continuing reform and pressure for reform in educa­
tional finance found in the U.S. today. Foundation plans, currently the 
most common type of grant in aid for elementary and secondary education, 
are being questioned as a result of this concept. This chapter is an 
analysis of one such foundation plan, Iowa's House File 
Iowa's grant in aid law is a foundation program much like the one 
declared unconstitutional in California by the Serrano v. Priest decision. 
A Serrano type case was filed in the U.S. District Court of Des Moines in 
early March, 1972.^ After the U.S. Supreme Court ruling on Rodriguez v. 
San Antonio, if the case is to be continued, it will be necessary to sub­
stantially revise it or move it to a state court. 
Benson generalizes foundation plans as those grants systems which 
2 institute a spending floor in the state below which no district may spend. 
Aid is distributed by a formula such as: 
(1) = n^F - rB^ 
^House File 65^, Iowa 6&th General Assembly, June, 1971» hereafter 
to be referred to as H.F. 6^k. 
2 Charles Benson, The Economics of Education (Boston; Houghton-
Mifflin Co., 1968), pp. 146-150. 
The suit was brought by the Iowa Property Taxpayers Association 
against the State Department of Public Instruction, the State Department 
of Revenue, and numerous state officials. 
IT 
where 
A. = aid to district i, 
= enrollment of district i, 
F E dollar value of the per pupil foundation, 
r = foundation mill age levy, and 
z assessed valuation of district i. 
If total district costs are greater than the amount funded "by the 
foundation, the difference in the total cost and the total foundation is 
funded by an additional levy on property or income. That is, if 
(2) - niF=Li>0 
then 
(3) - — (property levy), or 
®i 
Li 
^i ~ ^  (income levy), 
^i 
where 
Ci = total district cost, 
Li = additional cost to he locally funded, 
* 
r^ = additional local property levy, 
ti = additional local income tax rate, and 
Yi = local taxable income. 
In funding additional local effort, the relation between the fiscal 
capacity of the district and the rate of taxation is inverse. This is the 
source of the Serrano v. Priest argument. Wealthy school districts are 
able to provide a given dollar expenditure for a much lower tax rate than 
are poorer districts. If the foundation provides equal educational oppor­
tunity the grant system is neutral in the Serrano v. Priest sense. 
18 
However, if any portion of the equal educational opportunity must be 
funded by the additional local levy, a foundation program would not be 
considered neutral in the Serrano v. Priest sense.^ 
Benson, in discussing foundation programs, iarplicitly assumes that 
the foundation provides equal educational opportunity. He views rate 
variations as an indication of either local inefficiency or local pref­
erence for a more expensive educational program. Both of these causes of 
cost variation should be borne by the local district in the form of hi^er 
rates. 
For foundation plans to fulfill the spirit of the Serrano v. Priest 
decision the foundation must be set at a high enough level that it pro­
vides what all would interpret as equality of educational opportunity. 
Because of difficulty in defining the concept of educational opportunity, 
this would be and is being interpreted as full state funding with inter-
district equalization of expenditures as a goal. 
Iowa House File 
Iowa House File 65^ was signed into law June 30, 1971. It was to 
take effect July 1, 1972 with the beginning of fiscal year 1973. Prior to 
the effective date of H.F. 65^, several errors were discovered in the law. 
House File 1269 was passed in June, 1972 to correct the errors found in 
H.F. 654.^ Reference to H.F. 6^k hereafter means House File 6^U as 
^Serrano, et ai v. Priest, et al., California Supreme Court, August 30, 
1971, pp. 17-55. 
2^ 
Benson, Economics of Education, p. 152. 
^Eouse File I269, Iowa 6Uth General Assembly, June, 1972. 
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modified "by House File 1269 unless otherwise noted. 
House File is a foundation plan of the type previously described 
except for four modifications. These modifications are guaranteed mini­
mum per student aid distribution, a constraint on budget growth, deduc­
tion of miscellaneous income from state aid, and general fund millage 
constraints. Each of these modifications alters the interdistrict aid 
distribution of the foundation plan. The following is an analysis of the 
impact of these four modifications. 
Guaranteed Minimum Aid 
Foundation programs in^licitly assume that the financial needs of a 
school district are indicated by the number of students enrolled in that 
district and that the ability of the district to meet these financial 
needs is indicated by the district property tax base. 
E.F. 654 guarantees a mini mm, of $200 per public school student in 
average daily membership. Average daily membership is the total number 
of students enrolled for a specified period of time divided by the total 
number of days school vas actually held during that period. Average daily 
membership will generally be referred to as ADM. 
As previously noted, foundation plans tend to be "non-neutral" in the 
Serrano v. Priest sense if the foundation does not cover total district 
costs. A guaranteed minimum increases this problem. For example, con­
sider two school districts which are identical in everything except 
taxable property. Let both schools be spending $200 per pupil above the 
foundation. Let School 1 have taxable property such that 
^$200 per pupil is the guaranteed in Iowa. 
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(5) = n^F - rB^ = 0 
while School 2 has taxable property such that 
(6) Ag = ngF - rB2>o/ 
An unmodified foundation plan vould distribute aid to School 2 but not to 
School 1. 
The additional local levy (assuming a property levy) of each school 
would be 
(7) - n^F = $200 n^ 
(8) r* = h. 
for School 1 and 
(9) Lg = Cg - OgF = $200n2 
for School 2. Because of the larger value of B^, School 1 will have a 
lower additional millage levy (the Serrano v. Priest non-neutrality). 
With the guaranteed minimum of $200 per student. School 1 would 
receive n^$200 in state aid. School 2 would receive Ag subject to 
Ag> n2$200. Assume that A^J n2$200. The additional local effort now 
becomes 
(11) - n^(F + $200) = 0 
(12) rT = 0 
for School 1, while School 2 has the same additional local effort as prior 
to the guaranteed minimum, or 
(13) L2 — C2 — ^2^ ~ $200 n2 
^A definition of symbols is found on page IT of this chapter. 
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^2 E| 
for School 2. The addition of a guaranteed minimum aid distribution to a 
foundation plan benefits the school vith high taxable property more than 
the school with low taxable property. In the above case, the total 
millage rates without the guaranteed minimum would be r + r^ for School 1 
* 
and r + r^ for District 2. Hormal foundation plan "non-neutrality" will 
make r + rg > r + r^. The addition of the guaranteed minimum yields r as 
* 
the total millage for School 1, and r + r^ as the total millage for School 
2. The guaranteed minimum increases Serrano type "non-neutrality" by 
benefiting only schools relatively wealthy in property value. 
Two reasons could explain the existence of such a seemingly inequi­
table clause in ÏÏ.F. 65^. First, in Iowa, school districts with high 
a 
assessed valuation are primarily small, rural school districts. At the 
time H.F. 65^ was passed, rural Iowa played a dominant role in the state 
legislature. 
A second reason for inclusion of such a modification is recognition 
of the fact that enrollment and taxable property may be imperfect measures 
of the financial needs and ability of a school district. Districts with 
high assessed valuation per pupil in average daily membership in Iowa also 
tend to be small districts. Small districts tend to have higher than 
average costs due to lack of economies of scale available to larger dis­
tricts. In other words, a large portion of the total cost of the school 
district does not vary with enrollment. Therefore, each student enrolled 
See Appendix A for correlation of size and assessed valuation. 
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in a small district bears a larger portion of this cost than does a 
student in a larger district. For this reason, the guaranteed minimum, 
while increasing the susceptibility of E.F. o^k to Serrano v. Priest type 
criticism, could actually increase xhe equity of the law. It also could 
open the criticism that the law fosters inefficient schools in that it 
helps perpetuate the existence of small, high cost schools. 
Millage Constraints 
There are two general fund millage constraints in E.F. 6^4 which are 
intended to serve as buffers to aid the local districts and the state in 
adjusting to the new law. The maximum millage reduction, to last until 
school year 197^-75j is intended to keep the State of Iowa from paying 
enormous aid increases in the first few years of the foundation program. 
The second millage constraint, guaranteed state aid, is intended to insure 
that no local property tax rate increases result from E.F. 65^. 
In order to qualify for state aid (including the $200 minimum), the 
general fund millage of a district must be at least 90 percent of the 
previous year's general fund millage for all school years through 197^-75-
If a district's millage is reduced to below 90 percent of the previous 
year's millage due to the working of the foundation plan, state aid is 
reduced until the millage is 90 percent of the previous year's millage. 
If the district has not reached the 90 percent maximum millage reduction 
constraint when state aid is zero, it funds its entire cost out of local 
property taxes. After 197^-75, such districts will receive at least $200 
per student regardless of the amount of millage reduction. 
To insure that no school district would have its general fund millage 
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increased as a result of the operation of H.F. 65^, general fund millages 
are constrained, for the period from 1972-73 to 1976-77, to being no 
greater than the 1970-71 general fund millage. The year 1970-71 was 
chosen as a base year because school spending was frozen at that level for 
school year 1971-72. 
Unofficially known as "buy-out" aid, the guaranteed aid portion of 
H.F. 65^ actually affected very few districts. To qualify for this type 
of aid, a district must have a millage rate higher than the rate of the 
I97O-7I school year. For a total of five years beginning with school year 
1972-73, these funds will be available to reduce the millage of any dis­
trict with a millage rate higher than the 1970-71 general fund millage 
rate to a rate equal to the 1970-71 rate. Because of increased state 
share of total elementary-secondary funding, which is a result of H.F. 
6^h, few schools actually qualified for guaranteed state aid. 
Miscellaneous Income 
The third.modification of H.F. 65U which is a departure from con­
ventional foundation programs is the inclusion of miscellaneous income as 
a measure of district financial ability. With the initial writing of H.F. 
65^, miscellaneous income included school district income from all sources 
except the foundation property tax, state foundation aid. Federal Title I 
and Public Law 87^ aid, and any tax specifically provided for in H.F. 65^. 
Revenues from all federal sources except Title I and P.L. 87^, all 
state categorical aids, local fines designated to go to school spending, 
etc., were to be deducted from state aid on a dollar for dollar basis. 
This resulted in direct supplantation of state funds. Federal aid was 
2h 
being used to replace state aid. The result vas a threatened freeze on 
federal aid to elementary and secondary education to the State of Iowa. 
As noted by the U.S. District Court in Rodriguez v- San Antonio, federal 
aid to elementary and secondary education is . . manifestly intended 
to provide extraordinary services at the schools . • . . 
House File 1269 corrected the problem" of supplantation of state funds 
by excluding all federal funds from the definition of miscellaneous 
income. State categorical aid is still included in miscellaneous income. 
This effectively reduces the span of state control over local educational 
expenditure. Categorical aid represents specific purchasing power for the 
local district. Foundation aid is generalized purchasing power. Since 
the two types of aid are mutually exclusive, most local districts will 
choose foundation aid rather than categorical aid for two reasons. First, 
the set of expenditure alternatives is greater with foundation aid; second, 
the conditions to qualify for foundation aid are less stringent than those 
necessary to qualify for most types of categorical aid. Foundation aid 
involves less red tape. 
Maximum Allowable Growth 
The per pupil expenditures of school districts are constrained to 
increase at a rate no greater than the three-year moving average of the 
increase of state general fund revenues and statewide assessed valuation 
of taxable property, adjusted for changes in rates, basis, or assessment 
practices. This growth constraint is the fourth modification which 
^Rodriguez v. San Antonio, U.S. District Court of the Western 
District of Texas, 1971. 
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differentiates Iowa's E.F. 65^ from a conventional foundation program. 
All school districts' are constrained by this maximum allowable growth 
figure. The state comptroller determines the maximum allowable growth. 
Not all schools may increase expenditures by this maximum figure. If the 
per pupil expenditure of a district is greater than 110 percent of the 
state average per pupil expenditure, or if the allowable growth would 
place the district above the 110 percent figure, the district is allowed 
no growth or only that portion of the allowable growth which would equate 
its cost to 110 percent of state average cost. 
For purposes of analysis here, the assumption is made that all 
schools desire to grow at the maximum allowable rate. If districts did 
not desire a higher rate of budget growth than the one allowed by the 
growth constraint, the growth constraint would be unnecessary. 
A growth constraint applied across the board like this one ties all 
schools which grow at the maximum allowable rate to the relative spend­
ing positions they occupied at the beginning of the growth constraint. 
This means that high spending schools will remain high spenders and low 
spending schools will remain low spending schools. The 110 percent cost 
constraint for allowable growth will narrow the gap between the highest 
spending schools and the rest but will not eliminate spending differen­
tials or alter relative spending positions. 
While such a growth constraint effectively keeps educational spend­
ing under control, it can be criticized for several reasons. First, it 
assumes that the rate of increase in the cost of education is the same as 
the rate of increase in revenues from the state generail fund and property 
taxes. There is no appeirent basis for this assumption. 
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Second, legislated cost increases of this type do not permit cost 
increases for purposes of quality improvement. If a school is a low 
spending school because of low quality inputs, it cannot increase the 
quality of its educational process by spending more money for higher 
quality inputs unless this can be done within the allowable growth con­
straint. However, if higher spending does not improve the quality of a 
school's educational offering, such a criticism would not be valid. 
A third criticism of this growth constraint is that inequities which 
exist at the beginning of the period in which the constraint takes effect 
are maintained throughout the period. If the relative spending positions 
of school districts in Iowa were determined on the basis of a suspect 
classification such as wealth, these positions would be maintained 
throughout the time period of H.F. 654. 
To see how the initial spending positions were determined, the 
following test was made. Per pupil expenditure net of federal funds was 
chosen as a measure of state-local expenditures. To see what determined 
the relative spending positions for school year 1970-71, this per pupil 
expenditure figure was used as a dependent variable in a multiple regres­
sion model. Independent variables selected were district assessed valua­
tion, courses offered per district, average teacher salary, average daily 
membership of the district, and courses taught per teacher. Units offered, 
enrollment, average teacher salary, and average number of courses taught 
per teacher were intended as proxies for the cost and quality elements of 
the local district expenditures. Property value is included to isolate 
the effect district wealth has on local district expenditures. 
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A stratified random sangle of 50 districts vas dravn from the k^3 
districts of the State of Iowa. The stratification was such that each 
size class district was represented in the sample Tsy the same proportion 
it is in the population of districts. Expenditure per student was chosen 
as the dependent variable and regressed on assessed valuation per student, 
enrollment, courses taught per teacher, total different courses taught "by 
the district, and average teacher salary. Both linear and multiplicative 
equations were used with the multiplicative showing a "better" fit. The 
relationship between expenditures per pupil, property values, enrollment, 
and the variables used for quality proxies was essentially non-linear. 
The results of the regression estimates of the spending function of the 
local districts are shown in Table 2-1. 
The results indicate that property wealth of the local school dis­
trict plays a major role in determining the level of per pupil expendi­
tures. In both the linear and non-linear estimates, stepwise regression 
indicated assessed valuation per pupil in average daily membership as the 
independent variable with primary explanatory power. The addition to the 
2 total R made by assessed valuation was in excess of 0.1; 1 for both equa­
tions. Based on this evidence, the relative spending differentials which 
the growth constraint of H.F. 65^ will maintain are differentials which 
are determined by property values rather than cost variations. If this 
is the case and one assumes, as the California Supreme Court did, that 
higher spending means better schools, Iowa's H.F. insures the continua­
tion of a system which has its initial distribution based on a suspect 
classification, property wealth. 
Another problem caused by the growth constraint surfaced with the 
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Table 2-1 
Regression Estimates of Spending Functions 
of 50 Iowa School Districts®-
Variables : 
Dependent; C s Cost per pupil 
Independent: = Assessed valuation per student 
Xp = Average daily membership 
XI s Average courses taught per teacher 
X, = Total different courses taught 
X^ E Average teacher salary 
Functions estimated: 
(1) C = + B^X^ + BgXg + BgXg + Bj^Xj^ + B^X^ 
(2) C = B^X®^X2^X^XJ^Z®5 
Function 
Estimates'® 
Bo Si B2 S3 
1 799.76 0.0126 -0.0505 -60.3631 
(0.003) (0.0458) (51.9811) 
2 60.68 0.1039 -0.6322 -0.6322 
(0.0398) (0.104l) (0.1128) 
34 3; R2 
1 O.8U22 U.S.® 0.4k8 
M.S.c 
2 0.6097 0.3790 0.6828 
(0.153k) (0.1519) 
^ample data from Iowa, Secretary's Annual Report, 1970-71. 
lumbers in parentheses are standard errors of the B coefficients. 
^Average teacher salary was not significant in the linear estimate. 
passage of H.F. 1269. Prior to the passage of 1269, Federal Title I and 
P.L. 87^ funds were not included in the cost figure used to confute the 
maximum budget for allowable growth. All other federal funds were. Pas­
sage of 1269 removed all federal funds from miscellaneous income and 
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placed all federal funds including Title I and P.L. 8?^ funds in the cost 
figure used to compute the budget growth ceiling. 
Funds coming to the local district as a result of P.L. 87I; are known 
as impacted area funds. They are intended to supplement the tax hase of 
those school districts containing large areas of federal land. Federal 
land pre-empts the local property tax base and could place hardship on 
such local districts in the absence of 874 type aid. 
The major portion of federal aid to education in the State of Iowa 
for school year 1970-71 was Title I aid."^ Title I aid is intended "... 
to expand and improve elementary and secondary school programs for edu-
Q 
cationally deprived children in low income areas." 
The effect of including all federal funds in the cost figure used to 
compute the budget growth ceiling is to push those marginal schools which 
receive large amounts of Title I and P.L. SjU funds into the category of 
schools allowed partial or no growth. Since the purpose of the growth 
constraint is to limit local property taxes by limiting school expendi­
tures, the inclusion of either type of aid in such a constraint is 
questionable. A school district could be denied growth because it is so 
unfortunate as to be in an area containing large amounts of federal land, 
because it is a low income area, or because it has an aggressive, fund 
seeking superintendent. 
^lowa Department of Public Instruction, Iowa Secretary's Annual 
Report Summary (Des Moines, Iowa: Iowa Department of Public Instruction, 
1971), p. 3. 
®U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, School Progreuns 
for Educationally Deprived Children (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1965), p. 1. 
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Summary 
Iowa's basic grant-in-aid system for elementary and secondary edu­
cation is a constrained, modified, foundation program. Foundation pro­
grams are subject to criticism of the Serrano v. Priest type. The modi­
fications and constraints of leva House File 65^ do not enhance the 
ability of the law to withstand Serrano v. Priest type criticism. 
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CHAPTER III: ALTERNATE AID PR0GRAI4S 
Foundation Aid Concepts 
Foundation program aid plans, originally suggested for educational 
use by Strayer and Haig in 1923,^ are designed to provide a TninimiTn level 
of money per child at equal tax rates, regardless of district fiscal 
capacity. Presently, foundation plans are the most widespread type of 
educational grant. Foundation programs do not, the way they are most 
generally used, conform to the Serrano v. Priest criteria for aid 
distribution. 
Charles Benson presents a genereuLization of foundation aid plans as 
those plans characterized by an aid distribution of the form: 
A^ = n^F - rB^ 
where 
A^ = foundation aid to district i, 
n^ 5 enrollment of district i, 
F 5 per student foundation ( dollar terms ) , 
r 5 compulsory local millage rate, and 
B^ s property tax base of district i. 
Variation in local tax rates can arise from spending more per student than 
the amount provided by the foundation plan. This type of tax rate varia­
tion is supposed to reflect either local district inefficiency or local 
^George D. Strayer and Robert M. Haig, Financing of Education in the 
State of New York (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1923). 
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desire for a higher per student expenditure. 
In Iowa, all school districts spend a per pupil amount greater than 
the foundation provided "by H.F. 65b. This additional local effort is 
funded by a property levy in addition to the required foundation levy.^ 
This additional local levy is: 
» % 
where 
r* s additional millage in district i, 
= additional expenditure to be funded, and 
= local property tax base of district i. 
Utilization of an additional property levy on an unadjusted tax base 
causes a type of tax rate variation not mentioned by Benson. In funding 
the amount spent above the foundation, rates can vary due to property tax 
base variations. 
The Serrano v. Priest criteria do not preclude interdistrict tax 
rate variations due to spending variations. Rate variations caused by 
tax base variations would be precluded l%r the Serrano criteria because of 
the possibility that this type of variation could place limits on educa­
tional expenditure (and by the Court's assumption, educational quality).^ 
^Charles Benson, The Economics of Education (Boston: Houghton-
Mifflin Co., 1968), pp. 146-50. 
^House File 6$4, Iowa 6bth General Assembly, June 30, 1971. 
^John Coons, "What the Court Decided and What It Did Not Decide," in 
California Supreme Court Decision: Serrano v. Priest, ed. by J. Scribner 
(Los Angeles: U.C.L.A. Education Extension, 1971), p. I8. 
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Only in the extreme case where the level of the foundation is so hi^ no 
district has an additional amount to be funded, or in the case vhere no 
interdistrict tax base variation exists, would an unmodified foundation 
plan pass the Serrano v. Priest test for constitutionality, given a strict 
interpretation of the criterion. 
There are three alternatives to the Strayer-Eaig foundation programs 
which are generally accepted as meeting the Serrano-Priest criteria.^ 
Redistricting and restructuring the geographic size of districts for the 
purpose of equalization of district per pupil property values is one pro­
posed alternative. The second is the implementation of a percentage 
equalizing formula for aid distribution.^ Full state funding, with the 
state being totally responsible for the collection and distribution of 
school revenues is the third alternative. 
All three of these proposals totally ignore the foundation concept. 
The strong points of a foundation program, providing a minimum level of 
resources at equal rates while maintaining a large degree of decentrali­
zation, are points that should not be ignored. Certain modifications of 
the foundation concept and incorporation of a percentage (power) equali­
zing program with it could possibly meet the Serrano criteria while main­
taining the foundation program's strong points. The implication of these 
alternatives will now be explored. 
Due to problems of inter-govemmental coordination such as those 
^Charles Benson, "Selecting a School Finance Alternative," in Cali­
fornia Supreme Court Decision; Serrano v. Priest, ed. by J. Scribner 
(Los Angeles; U.C.L.A. Education Extension, 1971), pp. 9-l6. 
^Percentage equalizing grants are now conmonly called power equsili-
zing grants. The two terms will be used interchangeably here. 
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previously discussed, all federal funds will be subtracted from cost 
figures prior to confutation of any aid distribution in the following 
sections. The rationale for this is essentially twofold. First, as 
previously noted, most federal funds are categorical grants to be uti­
lized for specific purposes. To include them in cost-aid computations 
could negate the purpose of distribution of such funds. Second, the 
social and economic externalities of education are such that each level 
of government should pay a portion of the educational cost for reasons of 
economic efficiency if a benefit principle of taxation is used.^ Separate 
accounting for the federal, state and local funds could ease the compu­
tation of costs and benefits for each level of government, and increase 
the overall efficiency of the aid distribution system. 
Redistricting 
Charles Benson feels redistricting would be a very difficult program 
to pass politically, and predicts that it is "not a likely prospect.""^ 
In the absence of legislative or judicial action forcing it, massive 
school district reorganization is deemed impossible in states with a large 
number of districts. 
William Inman says, when speaking of the causes of this reluctance to 
reorganize, "Increased school size is often a threat to the autonomy of 
many units of a state school system; it may even be a threat to the 
g 
J. Ronnie Davis, "The Social and Economic Externalities of Educa­
tion," in Economic Factors Affecting the Financing of Education, ed. by 
Roe Johns, et al.(Gainesville, Florida; Sfational Educational Finance 
Project, 1970), pp. 59-80. 
Y 
Benson, "Selecting a School Finance Alternative," pp. 6-7. 
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existence of many units." The school is often an ego extension of the 
"school administrators of small school districts and. the members of the 
hoards of education in such districts." Reorganization threatens the loss 
of current positions for these individuals.® 
Assuming redistricting was to he found politically feasible, there 
are certain other basic objections that render it practically question&le. 
Property values, even if initially organized into equal groups, are not 
bound to change in a homogeneous fashion thus making reorganization a 
recurring event reducing the stability of the local school district. 
A second problem inherent in using redistricting as a means of 
obtaining equality of funding at the state level is the problem of within 
district allocations. In multiplant school districts, it would be possi­
ble for allocation bias to exist among schools the same way it exists 
among districts without reorganization. This could especially be a prob­
lem in large urban districts which encompass both wealthy and poor areas 
of the city. A within district, among school allocative mechanism, would 
have to be derived to eliminate this type of problem. 
According to the National Educational Finance Project, present lit­
erature points toward an increased emphasis on school needs as one of the 
criteria for aid distribution.^ Educational need in this context is 
generally based on a discrepancy model. Arbitrary norms are established 
^William Inman, "Size Factors and State School %rstem Organization," 
in In Planning for School District Organization, ed. by Ralph Purdy 
(Lincoln, Nebraska: The Great Plains School District Reorganization 
Project, June, 1968), pp. 159-60. 
9 National Educational Finance Project, Future Directions for School 
Financing (Gainesville, Florida: National Educational Finance Project, 
1971), pT 10. 
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by the aid distributing entity; an assessment of the departure from these 
norms by the children of the school, district or state is made, and the 
discrepancy is defined as educational need. Garms and Smith in their 
study of school aid in ïïev York State, believe the consolidation of dis­
tricts would be unlikely to aid in the creation of a measure based on the 
needs of individual schools. They see the district, as it exists, as too 
large a unit for this type of analysis because the assessment of need is 
most effectively made at either the individual pupil or school building 
level. Larger, reorganized districts would be detrimental for this type 
of estimation of educational needs. 
As the 65th Session of the Iowa Legislature opened, the battle over 
legislatively-forced reorganization was seen as a major issue. The prob­
lem facing the legislature is the tradeoff between the economic-educa­
tional feasibility of small districts, and the fact that the supporters 
of small schools constitute a viable political force in lowa.^^ Evidence 
of the widespread support for small schools could be seen in the opposi­
tion of the Farm Bureau to the reorganization plan-study suggested by 
T p 
Governor Robert Ray. The Iowa Senate rejected redistricting by legis-
lative mandate on April T, 1973. Because it is possible through grants 
^^Walter Garms and Mark Smith, Development of a Measure of Educa­
tional Need and Its Use in A State Support Formula (Albany, Hew York; Hew 
York State Education Conference, June, 1969), p. 26. 
^^See Richard Doak, "Aid for Small Schools Urged Over Reorganizing," 
Pes Moines Register, November 30, 1972; and Richard Doak, "Small School 
Fight Seen, Des Moines Register, January 20, 1973, p. 20. 
^^James Flaasburg, "School Reorganization Plan Opposed by Farm 
Bureau," Des Moines Register, January 11, 1973, p. h. 
^^"Major Bills in Iowa Legislature," Pes Moines Register," April 8, 
1973, p. 9. 
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systems to create economic incentives that would promote reorganizations 
arising from decentralized, local decision-making, no eoinplete assessment 
of possible redistricting schemes will be undertaken here. 
Percentage Equalizing Grants 
Percentage equalizing aid distribution is a matching grant program 
with the state-local percentage shares predetermined but having the amount 
of state support adjusted according to the fiscal capacity of the dis­
trict. The primary purpose of distribution of such grants-in-aid is to 
increase the volume of expenditures on educational services by lowering 
the "price" of education to the local district. 
By reducing the price of additional expenditures to the local dis­
trict, percentage equalizing grants tend to increase the amount of educa­
tion purchased by the local district, assuming education has a negatively 
sloped demand curve. Total local spending will increase as state aid 
increases up to the point of unitary elasticity of demand upon the local 
district education demand curve. Beyond this point, the state must pro­
vide an increasingly larger share to increase purchases of educational 
services because of the inelasticity of local demand. 
Percentage equalizing grants beise the district tax rate on the per 
student amount the district draws from the common pool of educational 
resources available in the state. The state becomes the relevant fiscal 
base. Any two districts choosing to tax themselves at the same rate would 
generate the same dollar amount of revenue per student in average daily 
^^Erick Lindman, "Implementing a School Finance Alternative," in 
California Supreme Court Decision: Serrano v. Priest, ed. by J. Scribner 
(Los Angeles: U.C.L.A. Education Extension, 1971)» pp. 7-8. 
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attendance. The state pays a predetermined percentage of locally deter­
mined expenditures, with the percentages of state support varying in-
versely with the fiscal capacity of the local district. 
Benson, using assessed valuation per student in average dally attend­
ance as a measure of fiscal capacity, generalizes the percentage equali­
zing aid distribution formula as: 
A = (1 -
^ B/n 
where 
i = local district, 
A 5 aid to district, 
X = percent of local support, 
B = average assessed valuation for the state, 
B^ = assessed valuation of district i, 
n = total state enrollment, 
= total district enrollment, and 
C = total district expenditure. 
Percent of local support is weighted "by the ratio of district per student 
assessed valuation to state per student assessed valuation. Vhen district 
per student assessed valuation (B^/n^) is equated to state per student 
assessed valuation, the predetermined percentage of state support (l - x), 
is achieved. Assessed valuation per student greater than the state aver­
age reduces the state percentage of support while assessed valuation less 
than state average increases the state share. 
l^Benson, The Economics of Education, p. 1^8. 
39 
With pure percentage equalizing, state aid as a percent of district 
cost cajTi theoretically range from +100 to The upper limit is reached 
when B^/n^, assessed valuation per pupil, is zero. From the 100 percent 
maximum, aid is reduced by a factor of -2L_ for each increment in district 
B/n 
assessed valuation. State aid, per se, reaches zero at the level where 
B^/n^ = . At levels of district assessed valuation per pupil higher 
than , an additional property tax, to he redistributed by the state, 
is levied on the district thus causing the percentage of the state support 
to become negative. This particular redistributional aspect of pure per­
centage equalizing programs has not been found politically acceptable, 
except in Utah.^^ However, in the opinion of John Coons, the Serrano 
criterion would require this type of redistribution. 
Percentage equalizing grants leave the problem of determining local 
needs entirely to the local authorities with the state sharing in the 
1R funding of that need. Benson says, 
. . . there is no assurance that demands for educational spending in 
various local districts, reflecting the usual measure of altruism, 
selfishness, wisdom, shortsightedness, confusion, and prejudice, will 
establish a socially efficient geographic distribution of educational 
resources. 
This is a primary criticism of the percentage equalizing grant scheme. 
For purposes of control of local educational policy, percentage 
equalizing grants faJ.1 short of foundation programs. The cost sharing 
aspect of the percentage equalizing grant allows an inefficient district 
^^Ibid., p. 179. 
^^Coons, ""What the Court Decided and What It Did Not Decide," p. 22. 
^^Benson, The Economics of Education, p. l8l. 
40 
to share its extra expenses vith all taxpayers of the state. Thus, the 
incentive for good local management is reduced. 
Funds which are distributed under percentage equalizing grants are 
distributed in positive relation to local district spending and negative 
relation to local district fiscal capacity. For a given level of expendi­
ture, a higher level of subsidy is made available for schools which are 
relatively poor in terms of the fiscal capacity measure, than to those 
which are relatively wealthy in terms of the fiscal capacity measure. For 
a given level of fiscal capacity, higher spending by a local district 
results in higher tax rates. 
B./n. 
In the percentage equalizing formula, the quantity (x_3—i.) is sub-
B/n 
tracted from one to determine the percentage of state support. The quan­
tity, X, is a constant ranging from zero to one, representing the share of 
the costs the state desires the local district to fund. The quantity, 
(l - x), represents the state share or state percentage of funding for 
districts with average assessed valuation per student. The ultimate 
interdistrict state-local burden sharing under a system of percentage 
equalizing grants is thus determined by the fiscal capacity ratios of the 
districts, i.e., by the interdistrict weaJLth property distribution in the 
state, when property wealth per student is used to measure fiscal capacity. 
Data from the 1970-71 Secretary's Annual Report, State of Iowa, 
yields the following sort of distribution. Of the i»53 school districts 
existing at the time, 307 had assessed valuations per student greater than 
the state average and 1^+6 had less than the state average. The higher-
than-average fiscal capacity schools would receive aid at a percentage 
lower than the predetermined state percentage of support, while the lower-
lu 
than-average fiscal capacity schools would receive aid at a higher per­
centage than the predetermined state support level. 
Utilizing 1970-71 school year data, the following results can be 
obtained. By subtracting federal funds from general fund expenditures,^ 
a state-local cost figure of $$41,829,082 ($827 per pupil) is derived. 
p-Linding this 1970-71 cost figure by percentage equalizing type grants 
with a 35 percent^^ state support figure, assuming negative aid (pure per­
centage equalizing) results in state aid of $180,999,0^1 (33.^05 percent 
of the total cost), and $360,830,0^*1 in local property taxes (66.59 per­
cent of the total cost), yielding an average millage rate of 48.833. The 
fact that a larger number of schools have assessed valuations per student 
in average daily membership greater than the break-even per pupil assessed 
valuation would make the percentage of state cost less than the predeter­
mined 35 percent. 
The 32 percent of schools with below-average assessed valuations per 
student enroll 63 percent of the students and spend 6l percent of the total 
budget funded from state-local sources. For the entire group receiving 
subsidy greater than the predetermined level, the cost per student for 
1970-71 was $813.^^^ This was $l4 less than the state average of $827 for 
the same year. 
11 
'^General fund expenditures, as defined in Iowa Department of Public 
Instruction Research Bulletin Wo. 1000, p. lOb, are essentially the total 
costs of the district. 
^'^Thirty-five percent was selected as an arbitrsiry rate of support. 
Computation indicated that a rate of state support of 6k percent would be 
necessary to insure that all districts except the one wealthiest receive 
some amount of aid, given the 1970-71 property tax distribution in Iowa, 
and a percentage equalizing grant system. 
^^^See Table 3-1, p. h3. 
h2 
Effects of allowing or not allowing surtaxes as a redistributive 
device are shown "by Table 3-1. Assuming surtaxes are allowed, the state 
portion of aid to Group I schools (schools receiving positive state aid) 
would be reduced by 7.05 percent. Group I schools constitute T5«T percent 
of the total number of districts and contain 91 percent of the students. 
They are backed by 83.1 percent of the total assessed valuation and 
account for 89.6 percent of the 1970-71 general fund expenditures. Cost 
per pupil in ADM and assessed valuation per pupil in ADM are both below 
state Average. 
Group II schools would be hard hit by utilising surtaxes as a redis-
tributive device. These schools are primarily small schools with high 
($962 average) per pupil expenditures. Imposition of the surtax would 
boost average per pupil tax collected in these districts to $1,179» This 
would be the money cost of financing an average per pupil expenditure of $962. 
Group I, as described in Table 3-1, contains a subset of lk6 districts 
which have an assessed valuation per student less than the state average. 
These districts, under percentage equalizing, receive a higher than aver­
age subsidy because of their relatively low fiscal capacity. Table 3-2 
shows a breakdown of these schools according to size class.^ The absolute 
^The Iowa Department of Public Instruction uses the following arbi­
trary size index: 
Size Class District Enrollment 
1 
2 
3 
1; 
5 
6 
7 
0 - U99 
500 - 7k9 
750 - 999 
1,000 - 1,1+99 
1,500 - 1,999 
2,000 - 2,999 
3,000 plus 
Table 3-1 
Percentage Equalizing Using Surtax and Redistribution Compared 
with Percentage Equalizing with Only Positive Aid®' 
Total Group I^ 
Percent of 
Total Group 11° 
Percent of 
Total 
Number of Districts 
Assessed Valuation 
Enrollment 
Assessed Valuation Per 
Public School Pupil 
in ADM 
General Fund 
Expenditures 
Cost Per Pupil 
1*53 
$7,389,309,777 
655,356 
$11,279 
$5^1,829,082 
$827 
3k3 
$6,11*3,381,26»* 
596,658 
$10,296 
$1*85,31*1* ,667 
$813 
75.70 
83.10 
91.00 
89.60 
110 
$1,21*5,928,513 
58,698 
$21,226 
$56,1*81* ,667 
$962 
2k.30 
16.90 
9.00 
10. ko 
Assuming Usé of Surtax 
State Aid 
Local Property Tax 
Millage 
$180,999,ok1 
$360,830,01*1 
1*8.833 
$193,772,21*0 
$291,572,1*27 
1*7.1*61 
107.05 
80.81 
-$12,773,199 
$69,258,866 
55.588 
-7.05 
19.19 
^From Iowa, Secretary's Annual Report, 1970-71. 
^Group I schools are those schools "below the "break-even assessed valuation per student. 
°Group II schools are those above the "break-even figure (i.e., receive zero or negative aid). 
Table 3-1—Continued 
Assuming No Surtax Total Group 
Percent of 
Total 
Group II® 
Percent of 
Total 
State Aid 
Local Property Tax 
Millage 
$193,772,21*0 
$3k8,058,09b 
1*7.102 
$193,772,21*0 
$291,572,1*27 
1*7.1*61 
, 100.00 
83.77 
— 0 — 
$56 ,1*85 ,667 
1*5.336 
- 0 -
16.23 
Difference in State Aid 
Surtax vs. Ho Surtax 
Difference in Local 
Property Tax 
Difference in Millage 
$12,773,199 
-$12,773,199 
-1.731 1 
1 
1 
0
0
 
0
 
1 
1 
1 $12,773,199 
-$12,773,199 
-10.252 
^5 
Table 3-2 
Size Class Distribution of Schools with 
Lower Than Average Fiscal Capacity^-
Size Class 
All 1 2 3 k 5 6 7 
Number in 
Size Class ihS 15 22 26 25 6 27 25 
Percent of 
Size Class 100.0 12.1 19.8 37.1 k2.k 26.1 71.1 86.2 
Percent of 
Category 10.3 15.1 17.8 17.1 h.l 18.5 17.1 
^rom Iowa, Secretary's Annual Report, 1970-71. 
number of schools receiving grant percentage increases seems relatively 
insensitive to size class. However, when the number is expressed as a 
percentage of the total number of schools in the size class, a definite 
relationship between size and relatively low fiscal capacity is indicated. 
The remaining 197 Group I schools and the 110 Group II schools all 
have assessed valuation per student in ADM greater than the state average. 
For this reason, the percentage of state support is lower than the nominal 
rate for these schools. Table 3-3 shows the size class distribution of 
this group of 307 schools. Again, there is a definite relation between 
the size of the school and the fact that there is a lower rate of state 
support. The smaller schools tend to have higher than average fiscal 
capacity per pupil and under percentage equalizing aid distribution, would 
be at a relative disadvantage congared to larger schools. 
By looking at the subset of these 307 schools which contains only 
li6 
Table 3-3 
Size Class Distribution of Schools with 
Larger Than Average Fiscal Capacity^ 
Size Class 
All 1 2 3 k 5 6 7 
Number in 
Size Class 307 108 89 hk 3h 17 11 k 
Percent of 
Size Class 100.0 87.8 80.2 62.9 57.6 73.9 28.9 13.4 
Percent of 
Category 35.1 29.0 14.3 11.1 5.5 3.5 1.3 
^From Iowa, Secretary's Annual Report, 1970-71. 
those districts that would be surtaxed under pure percentage equalizing, 
the previously noted relation between size and percent of state support is 
reinforced. As is readily apparent from Table 3-k, around 85 percent of 
Table 3-4 
Size Class Distribution of Schools Paying Surtax®" 
Size Class 
All 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Number in 
Size Class 110 59 35 10 4 1 1 0 
Percent of 
Size Class 100.0 47.96 41.5 14.3 6.8 4.3 2.6 0 
Percent of 
Category 53.6 31.8 9.1 3.4 0.9 0.9 0 
^From Iowa, Secretary's Annual Report, 1970-71. 
the schools paying surtax would have less than 750 students in total 
enrollment. 
Percentage equalizing in its pure form would bias aid distribution 
in favor of large Iowa districts in two basic ways. Both result, not from 
the intent of the formula, but from the distribution of taxable property 
in Iowa. Because of the fact that in Iowa, as school size rises, property 
value per student tends to fall, most of those with less-thaa-average fiscal 
capacity, receiving a higher percentage of subsidy than average, are large. 
Due also to the relation between tax base per student and enrollment, 
small schools, as a whole, receive a lower (possibly even negative) rate 
of aid than do large schools. 
This biases the price per student of a small school upward and can 
be used as a mechanism to encourage consolidation of smaller districts. 
As previously noted, reorganization through direct legislation is both 
politically difficult and practically suspect. Provision of an economic 
incentive to redistrict, which a percentage equalizing grants system would 
do by introducing a price bias based on size, would be a more feasible 
means of reorganization than direct legislation. It would allow a decen­
tralized decision making process to occur. If a small district felt it 
necessary to maintain its separate existence, this type of process would 
not force the district out of existence. 
Full State Rinding 
Full state funding is the third type of fiscal system generally 
accepted as constitutional under Serrano v. Priest for funding elementary 
and secondary education systems. This type of funding scheme reduces the 
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power delegated to the local districts by the state. Such jsroposals would 
not, of necessity, limit local control over educational policy. Only 
local control over revenue raising and budget level would have to be 
limited to implement full state funding. Benson views full state funding 
19 
as the logical extension of the state's responsibility for education. 
Under such funding schemes, the state becomes the agent of primary 
responsibility in collecting and distributing the educational funds. The 
mechanisms for generation and distribution of funds are not as explicit 
within the concept of full state funding as they are within foundation or 
power-equalizing programs. The levy under full state funding must be 
state-wide, so any combination of statewide sales, property or income 
taxes could be used. In New York, where such a proposal is being seriously 
considered, initial use of a property levy is being proposed, with a 
20 gradual replacement by a levy deemed mere equitable by the state. Equity 
of the aliocative mechanism must also be considered in devising an alloca-
tive mechanism for this type of funding scheme. 
Benson sees six major areas of concern in designing a full state 
funding system.First, since revenue generation is to become the respon­
sibility of the state, the choice of levy and the type of expenditures to 
be covered by the levy should also be determined by the state. This would 
most likely include only operating expenses. Expenses such as debt service^ 
^^Benson, "Selecting a School Finance Alternative," pp. 9-11. 
2®IUew York State Commission on the Quality, Cost, and Financing of 
Elementary and Secondary Education, Commission Report (Albany, Hew York: 
The State Education Department, 1972), p. 28. 
^"Benson, "Selecting a School Finance Alternative," pp. 9-11. 
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coninunity service, capital equipment cost and new construction would prob­
ably be left to the discretion of the local district. 
Second, if one accepts the Serrano logic, a leveling of expenditures 
is necessary. Leveling is a term used by educational administrators to 
describe equalization of expenditures. Leveling up implies inducing lower 
spending districts to increase expenditures at a more rapid rate than 
higher spending districts. Leveling down is generally interpreted to mean 
forcing expenditure cutbacks on higher spending districts. Otherwise, ' 
full state funding would continue to fund spending differentials founded 
on an improper base. Leveling down of high spending districts would be 
very difficult because of the large number of contractual obligations of 
pp 
the local district. In Iowa, the same problem of contractual obliga.-i' 
tions would make leveling down of high spending districts difficult. 
Benson fails to take account of possible necessary expenditure variations 
such as lack of economies of scale in small school districts when making 
this point. 
Leveling up brings up the third aspect of full state funding. The 
state must determine a defensible basis for allocating money to local dis­
tricts. This inçlies a great need to improve measures of educational need. 
Benson suggests the accounting for regional price differentials as a pos­
sible starting place for defining such a base. 
Fourth, to ease the process of determining a defensible basis for 
educational aid distribution, Benson advocates the establishment of 
regional educational centers for certain types of activity as a fourth 
pO 
New York State Commission, Commlssion Report, p. 26. 
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area of concern. For example, special programs for vocational education, 
student transport programs for the handicapped and other types of aid in 
kind, would reduce the need for aid in money. Most of these activities 
would probably exhibit economies of scale. 
Fifth, any power local authorities mi^t have to supplement educa­
tional programs by local taxation should be limited. The now common pro­
posal is that, if such power is granted at all, any such supplemental 
levies be of the power equalizing type. Thus, any two districts choosing 
the same rate of additional taxation would generate the same amount of 
revenue. 
Sixth and finally, Benson sees as implicit within the idea of full 
state funding a shift in power, from the local to the state level, to 
engage in collective bargaining with professional and non-professional 
staff. This would also ease the process of determining a defensible dis­
tribution mechanism by eliminating the possibility of inter-regional wage 
differentials not being accounted for. 
In a commission report, the New York State Commission on the Quality, 
Cost, and Financing of Elementary and Secondary Education concluded that 
full state funding was, for the State of New York, the most feasible 
alternative which would conform to the Serrano v. Priest criteria. The 
recommendations of the Commission reflect those areas Benson saw as major 
concerns. The Commission recommended cost leveling, aid distribution 
based on educational need, regional educational centers and statewide 
collective bargaining for teachers.^3 
^^Ibid., pp. 24-26. 
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The cost leveling aspect of the recommendation of the Hev York Com­
mission is essentially a growth freeze on high spending schools. It is 
similar to the budget growth constraints of Iowa H.F. 65^.^ Under the 
lîew York plan, schools would be ranked according to per pupil expenditure 
and all those below the 65th percentile would be brought up to that level 
within three years. Those schools above the 65th percentile would be 
allowed to maintain their higher spending at full state support, but 
would not be allowed per pupil budget growth until the rest of the state's 
schools had risen to meet them. 
A simulated application of full state funding to Iowa was made to 
assess the impact of this type of funding on the state. Data from school 
year 1970-71, with all federal contributions subtracted, was used. As a 
leveling up device, the budget growth constraint of H.F. 65^ was utilized. 
Without federal funds, average per pupil cost is $827. Under H.F. 65^5 
budgets were constrained to being less than 110 percent of average state 
cost per pupil in ADM if budget growth was to be allowed. Applying this 
constraint to $827 yields a $910 monetary constraint. Schools with average 
per pupil costs greater than $910 would not be allowed budget growth. 
A three-year period during which expenditures would be leveled was 
assumed. Each district below the 110 percent state average cost per pupil 
jtt 
See Chapter 2 for a discussion of budget growth under Iowa's 
H.F. 63h. 
ilU 
A comparison between this limit and a percentile figure such as Hew 
York uses was made. With the cutoff at the 65th percentile, nine more 
districts would be allowed growth by utilizing a 110 percent limit. Since 
the two are practically equivalent, the 110 percent limit was chosen 
because of its prior use in Iowa. 
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limit vould grow at one-third the absolute difference between its initial 
cost figure and the cost limit in each of the three years. As in lîew York, 
districts with spending above the 110 percent level would not be allowed 
growth until the rest of the state had risen to meet them. 
A plan of this type entails strict equalizing of per pupil expendi­
ture if used in the unmodified form outlined above. If equalization of 
expenditures does not mean equalization of opportunity, such a plan could 
be disequalizing with respect to educational opportunity. Modifications 
would be needed to account for interdistrict educational need, cost and 
process quality variations to insure equality of opportunity. However, 
since present interpretation of the Serrano v. Priest case concentrates 
on equal financing, the need-cost-quality aspects will be deferred to a 
later chapter.^ 
Combined state-local funding under percentage equalizing was 
$5^1,829,082. Elimination of those categories which would be left under 
local control leaves a figure of $52^,106,779 to be funded by the state. 
This is shown in Table 3-5. Funding this amount—65 percent from a prop­
erty levy and 35 percent from general funds—yields a millage con^arable 
to the state average millage for percentage equalizing as previously dis­
cussed in this chapter. 
The distributional impact of a full state funding scheme derives from 
two characteristics of the scheme. First, a statewide levy is used. This 
could mean that some districts are paying a larger amount than their total 
The conference proceedings edited by J. Scribner contain a good 
cross section of the present interpretation of Serrano v. Priest. 
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Table 3-5 
Overall BreaJcdown of Full State Funding^ 
State and Local Funding 
Less : Debt Service 
Capital Outlay 
Community Service 
State Funding 
$541,829,082 
$524,106,779 
1,145,585 
13,711,439 
2.865,279 
All Property Tax 
65% Property Tax - 3 5 %  General Fund 
70.9277 Mills 
46.1029 Mills 
^rom Iowa, Secretary's Annual Report, 1970-71. 
general fund expenditures. Thus, a redistribution from richer to poorer 
districts could occur. This is analogous to the percentage equalizing 
surtax. Second, leveling up could cause a type of distributional impact. 
Those districts which are not allowed growth due to leveling up do not 
receive increasing amounts of aid. As the lower spending districts grow, 
they receive an increasing portion of the total school hill relative to 
the high spending districts. Thus, a redistribution from high spending 
schools to low spending schools occurs. 
As Table 3-6 shows, in Iowa full state funding redistributes funds 
from small to large districts on both bases. Small districts, as a group, 
tend to have higher property values per student, and also tend to have 
higher per pupil expenditures. 
Keeping all expenditures above the $910 budget growth constraint con­
stant, and assuming no significant aggregate state enrollment changes, it 
would, cost approximately $22,530,900 to level all schools up to 110 percent 
Table 3-6 
Size Class Distribution of Districts Not 
Receiving Budget Growth and/or 
Paying Surtax®-
Size Class 
All 1 2 3 h 5 6 7 
ÎÎO Budget Growth 1U7 79 uu iiO 5 2 3 k 
Percent of Size Class 64.2 39.6 Ik.3 8.5 8.7 7.9 13.8 
Percent of Category 100.0 53.7 29.9 6.7 3.4 1.3 2.0 2.7 
Paying Surtax it9 27 12 k 5 0 1 0 
Percent of Size Class 21.1 11.7 7.1 6.8 0 2.6 0 
Percent of Category 100.0 53.1 26.5 10.2 8.2 0 2.0 0 
^Trom Iowa, Secretary's Annual Report, 1970-Tl. 
U 
of the 1970-71 average state cost over a three-year period.' Examining 
the size class distribution of the districts receiving leveling up funds, 
once again, shows a bias in favor of large districts. As Table 3-7 indi­
cates, percent of size class of those districts allowed growth increases 
as size class increases. 
Those districts with total costs greater than that amount raised by 
the statewide levy imposed on the district would be subsidized by the 
"surtaxed" districts of the state. Again, as shown in Table 3-7, the per­
cent of size class receiving favorable treatment shows a positive relation 
to enrolIment. Full state funding, like percentage equalizing, would 
favor large Iowa districts, as a group, over small Iowa districts. This 
§ Enrollments in Iowa have been constant or declining slightly. For 
further information on this point, the reader may contact I4r. Eldert 
Gryunendyke, Management Information, Department of Public Instruction, 
Des Moines, Iowa. 
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Table 3-7 
Size Class Distribution of Districts Allowed 
Growth and/or Receiving Aid Under 
Full State Funding®' 
Size Class 
All 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Allowed Growth 
Percent of Size Class 
Percent of Category 
306 
100.0 
kh 
35.8 
14.4 
67 
60.4 
21.9 
60 
85.7 
19.6 
54 
91.5 
17.6 
21 
91.3 
11.4 
35 
92.1 
11.4 
25 
86.2 
8.2 
Receiving Aid 
Percent of Size Class 
Percent of Category 
kOh 
100.0 
97 
79.9 
2k.1 
99 
88.3 
24.5 
66 
92.9 
16.3 
53 
93.2 
13.1 
24 
100.0 
5.9 
37 
97.4 
9.1 
28 
100.0 
6.9 
®Data for computations from Iowa, Secretary's Annual Report, 1970-71. 
is due to the relation between size of district, property values and level 
of expenditures. Full state funding plans of the type discussed would 
create economic incentives for district reorganization in Iowa if there 
are economies of scale to be gained by reorganization. The mechanism for 
creating economic incentives for district reorganization (consolidation) 
would be the allowable growth constraint. Those districts not being 
allowed growth would have incentive to merge with other districts if the 
merger would result in lower costs and allowable growth. 
Conclusion 
There are three commonly proposed alternatives to present methods of 
school finance which are considered constitutional under Serrano v. Priest 
criteria. They are school district reorganization, percentage equalizing 
and full state funding. 
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Because of the political difficulty with legislative redistricting 
and with the possibility of creating economic incentives to reorganize, 
legislated redistricting is not considered a feasible plan for the State 
of Iowa. Percentage equalizing and full state funding distribute funds 
and allocate tax burdens, to a large extent, on the size of the district 
in Iowa. This is because of the relations between district size, fiscal 
capacity and expenditure. 
If there is a negative relation between size of district and quality 
of education, if small districts have hi^ costs because of high overhead 
rather than high quality, both of the remaining alternatives, percentage 
equalizing and full state funding, when applied in Iowa, distribute funds 
and burdens on a suspect classification—district size. District size 
should no more be a relevant variable than should district wealth in 
determining access to educational opportunity. Only if per pupil expendi­
tures are true proxies of educational opportunity (as assumed by the Cali­
fornia Supreme Court) do percentage equalizing and full state funding meet 
the spirit of the Serrano v. Priest decision. 
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CHAPTER IV: EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURE 
AND EDUCATIONAL QUALITY 
As noted previously, the Serrano v. Priest decision vas based on 
several untested assumptions about the nature of the educational process 
as a production process. By accepting at face value the complaint that 
diminished fiscal capacity has a negative effect on the quality of educa­
tion, the California Supreme Court implicitly correlated educational 
expenditures with educational quality. The relationship between educa­
tional expenditures and quality of output should be subjected to more 
scrutiny than was given by the Court. 
In an attempt to further specify this relation, an investigation into 
literature dealing with the educational productive process was made. From 
this, variables were chosen as educational quality proxies to study the 
relation between these quality proxies and expenditures per pupil for 
Iowa school districts. The variation in per pupil expenditure was also 
studied to determine the extent to which the variation was caused by 
regional cost variations and economies of scale. 
Review of Supporting Literature 
Herbert Kiesling, in his attempt to measure costs and benefits of 
local government services in New York, found a "disappointingly weak" rela­
tion between expenditure per pupil and test scores at the school district 
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level.^ Test scores were used as a measure of output of the educational 
process after attempting to account for variance in pupil inputs such as 
intelligence and socio-economic status (hereafter referred to as SES). He 
also found a strong correlation between SES and per pupil expenditures. 
Kiesling's data consisted of a sample of 1,400 New York school dis­
tricts for the year 1957- The average daily attendance of the districts 
was 2,000. As a partial explanation for the poor relation between output 
(test scores) and expenditure, Kiesling said, 
. . , the small school district is the principal villain with 
respect to the overall weakness in the expenditure-performance 
relationship.^ 
For small districts as a group, he found no significant positive relation 
between performance and expenditure. In isolated instances, high school 
performance in small districts was actually negatively related to expendi­
ture per pupil. His overall conclusion is that significant differences in 
school efficiency do exist, and that this efficiency is related to size.3 
Burkhead, Fox and Holland studied the input-output relation in 
schools of two large cities, Atlanta and Chicago.^ Output was proxied by 
^Herbert J. Kiesling, "Measuring a Local Government Service: A Study 
of School Districts in New York State," Review of Economics and Statistics, 
XLIX (August, 1968), 356-68. 
^Ibid., 361. 
3Ibid., 363. 
^Jesse Burkhead, Thomas Fox and John Holland, Input and Output in 
the Large-City High Schools (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University 
Press, 1967), pp. 56-60. 
59 
M 
IQ scores, verbal and reading test scores, school holding power and post-
high school measures such as college attendance. Inputs included median 
family income as an SES proxy; age of physical plant; teacher character­
istics such as experience, salaries and formal education; teacher turnover 
student-teacher ratio and expenditure per pupil. 
In both Chicago and Atlanta, the non-school inputs which were used 
to proxy SES explained more of the output variation than all combined 
school inputs. Eo systematic response to school inputs was found. This 
was attributed to the relatively small variation among schools for school 
inputs and the high correlation between SES and inputs. 
In both cities, the only in-school variables having positive and 
significant effects on the output measures were teacher characteristics. 
Teacher turnover was found to be important in determining both test scores 
and post-highschool measures such as college attendance. Teacher salaries 
tended to be positively associated with verbal test scores but the signif­
icance was not great. Experience tended to explain a larger portion of 
output variation than formal education did. 
The results of the Burkhead, Fox and Holland study are very similar 
to a study, headed by Charles Benson, done for the California Senate in 
1965. Benson used test scores as an output proxy. Inputs which were used 
that yielded significant results included teacher characteristics (entirely 
proxied by teacher salaries) and student SES. For certain districts, 
^School holding power is defined as the quantity, (l minus the drop 
out rate ). It is used eis a proxy of educational output or process quality, 
and assumes that completion of the socially defined amount of schooling 
is good and necessary for all individuals. 
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class size and administrative staffing were in^ortant, but the'se districts 
vere few in number. 
Overall, Benson found what he considered to be a negative relation 
between district handicap and the ability of the district to overcome that 
handicap. SES was related to output in a positive, statistically signif­
icant manner. District resources purchased were positively related to 
composite district SES. The non-school factors (SES and IQ) were much 
more inçortant in explaining output than were school factors.^ 
Teacher characteristics were the single most important school factors 
in explaining output variation. All teacher characteristics were assumed 
to be explained by teacher salaries, so that higher salaries meant better 
teachers. This assumes a high degree of knowledge on the part of the 
hiring agency (school board) in that the above relation inglies that the 
qualities which differentiate teachers are readily discernible. 
far the most famous study concerning educational quality and 
expenditures done to date is Equality of Educational Opportunity (The 
Coleman Report), by James Coleman and others for the U.S. Office of Edu­
cation. It was a massive study involving some 600,000 students and 5,000 
schools. The findings of the study have been quite controversial.^ 
Essentially, the Coleman Report found that the socioeconomic status 
(SES) of the student, the SES composite of the school, and peer attitudes 
^Charles Benson, et al.. State and Local Fiscal Relationships in 
Public Education in California (Sacramento, Cal.1 Senate of the State 
of California, 1965), pp. 41-59. 
^James S. Coleman, et al.. Equality of Educational Opportunity 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 325-33. 
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were the primary determinates of school output variation.^ The effect of 
schools on achievement was found to "be very small compared to the out-of-
school factors such as SES. Given that no school factors account for much 
variation, teacher characteristics account for more than any other school 
factor. The implication is that schools have little influence on a child 
that is independent of the child's "background. As the report states, 
. . equality of educational opportunity through schools must imply a 
strong effect of schools that is independent of the child's immediate 
social environment . . . that strong independent effect is not present in 
American schools. 
Coleman's implication that schooling and achievement are not related 
when one accounts for SES factors caused an intensive study of the rela­
tions involved. îîuch criticism of the methodology of analysis, particu­
larly the statistical techniques used in the Coleman Report, has been 
voiced. In particular, a high degree of correlation "between independent 
variables makes the order in which the independent variables are entered 
into a regression equation important. The variable entered first will 
pick up the explanatory power the variables have in common, and its 
explanatory power will be overstated. When the other correlated indepen-
g 
dent variables are entered, their explanatory power is understated. 
George Masek and others re-analyzed the data from the Coleman Report 
7Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity, p. 325. 
O 
See Samuel Bowles and Henry Levin, "The Determinants of Scholastic 
Achievement—An Appraisal of Some Recent Evidence," Joui-nal of 
Resources, III (Winter, 1968), 3-24. Page ll; offers an in depth treat­
ment of this methodological problem. 
School output was proxied by average school district achievement. 
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using partial correlation techniques to account for out-of-school vari­
ables. This did little to change the basic implications of the study. 
In-school factors still tended to explaiin a moderate to low amount of out­
put variation. The change in technique indicated that the Coleman Report 
had understated the explanatory power of the school inputs, but that schocQ. 
g 
factors were still not as influential as out-of-school factors. 
The in-school factors which Masek, et al found most increased in 
explanatory power by the changed statistical techniques were those associ­
ated with teachers. This is consistent with the other studies cited. If 
schools affect achievement (output), the primary factor of influence is 
associated with teachers. 
Coleman found curriculum variation insignificant in determining 
achievement variation, thus implying that type of curriculum is unimpor­
tant. This is contrary to an earlier study by James Conant. Using 
SCAT-V and SCAT-Q tests'^ in an attempt to discover differences in educa­
tional quality among high schools in a control group and a comprehensive 
group, Conant found no major difference in the two groups. The control 
group schools are . .of acknowledged excellence and send a large 
^George Masek, et al.. Correlation and Regression Analyses of Dif­
ferences Between the Achievement Levels of Ninth Grade Schools from the 
Educational Opportunity Survey (Washington, D.C.: Rational Center 
for Educational Statistics, Office of Education, 1968), pp. 5^-55. 
(Mimeographed) 
^SCAT-V and SCAT-Q tests were verbal and quantitative skills tests 
developed by the Educational Testing Service in the late 1950's. 
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number of graduates to four year colleges. Conant did find a differ­
ence among schools based on breadth of curriculum. Most of his recommen­
dations for improving high schools are based on making the curriculum 
broader to increase the alternatives available to the individual student. 
If broadening a curriculum increases cost, cost variation due to curricu­
lum variation could mean quality variation according to the Conant study. 
Patricia Cayo Sexton found average family income, used as a proxy for 
social class, the primary determinant of achievement scores. The relation 
held also for school failings. Children from low income families tend to 
be retained in grade about four times as often as children from high 
income families.^^ 
The number of studies on the relation between educational outcome and 
educational expenditure is large. Most have three things in common. 
Expenditures, as such, show a very weak relation to educational outcome, 
regardless of how one measures outcome. Socioeconomic status, proxied by 
some variant of family income, tends to have more explanatory power than 
any (in some studies, all) in-school variable. The in-school variables 
which do have explanatory power are those associated with teachers such 
as teacher salaries, teacher verbal ability, load and experience. If 
schools alter the life chance of the individual, the mechanism by which 
they alter it is teachers. 
l^James B. Conant, The .American High School Today (New York; McGraw-
Hill, Inc., 1959), p. 33. 
TP Patricia Cayo Sexton, Education and Income: Inequalities of 
Opportunity in Our Public Schools (New York: The Viking Press, 1961), 
p. 93. 
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Eegional Teacher Salary Variation in Iowa 
Since teacher characteristics such as verbal ability, experience, 
turnover, and course load are, according to most studies, the most impor­
tant in-school factors for explaining variation in educational output as 
output is measured by test scores, a significant regional teacher salary 
variation within a state could mean that dollar per pupil cost figures are 
not, as assumed by Serrano v. Priest, adequate measures of educational 
quality. If such a vairiation is present, equalization of expenditures as 
under full state funding, without statewide collective bargaining, could 
cause less equality of educational opportunity by allowing districts in 
low teacher salary areas to purchase more real inputs per dollar spent. 
This assumes teacher quality is distributed homogeneously throughout the 
state. 
Existence of a non-equalizing regional teacher salary variation would 
not be possible if the market for teachers was perfect. It is probable 
that the market for teachers has relatively high information costs thus 
making the market less than perfect. Equalizing differentials are assumed 
to be not recognized by full state funding equalization grant models. 
An initial check for geographic teacher salary variation was made 
for the State of Iowa by observing the average teacher salary in each of 
Iowa's fifteen merged areas.^ Table 4-1 shows the merged area average 
teacher salary as a percent of the state average teacher salary. The 
range, from 92.5 percent in Area l4 to 106.9 percent in Area l6, seemed 
M 
A merged area in Iowa is a group of contiguous school districts 
constituting a large district. There are fifteen such areas in the state. 
The purpose of such a division is to provide a base for community colleges. 
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sufficiently large to warrant further investigation. 
Table it-1 
Merged Area Average Teacher Salary and Merged Area 
Average Teacher Salary as a Percent of State 
Average Teacher Salary, 1970-71^ 
Area^ 
Average 
Salary 
Percent of 
State Average 
1 $8,302 100.6 
2 8,319 100.8 
3 8,285 100.4 
h 8,550 103.6 
5 8,4kl 102.2 
6 8,296 100.5 
7 8,346 101.1 
9 8,5^1 103.4 
10 8,043 97.4 
11 8,283 100.4 
12 8,074 97.8 
13 7,991 96.8 
lU 7,631 92.5 
15 7,826 95.4 
16 8,822 106.9 
^rom Iowa, Secretary's Annual Report, 1970-71. 
^Area 8 has merged with Area 9 and no longer exists. 
A randomized complete "block design was used to attempt to isolate the 
13 
regional variation from other sources of cost variation. Due to the 
large number of small districts in Iowa and the possibility of salary 
variation due to district size, district size seemed to be a factor that 
needed to be controlled in the test. The simple correlation coefficient 
between average teacher salary and school size is 0.37. Property values 
See Bernard Ostle, Statistics in Research (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State 
University Press, 1963), pp. 363-75 for a discussion of randomized com­
plete block designs. 
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per student have small, negative (-0.088) simple correlation with average 
teacher salary, and as such were not controlled for explicitly.^ Teacher 
quality is assumed the same in each region. 
Using the fifteen merged areas as regional treatments and the seven 
size classes as blocks, a random sample for each treatment within each 
block was drawn.The results shown in Table ^-2, Analysis of Variance 
of Teacher Salaries, were obtained. The ratio of treatment mean squares 
Table h-2 
Analysis of Variance of Teacher Salaries®* 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square Ratio 
Mean 1 7,455,965,000 7,455,965,000 
Size (Blocks) 6 23,527,420 3,921,237 
Geographic (Treatment) l4 19,943,420 1,424,530 4.336 
Experimental Error 84 27,598,840 328,559 
^Computed from Iowa, Secretary's Annual Report, 1970-71. 
to error mean squares is distributed F with lU and 8^ degrees of freedom. 
This F ratio can be used to test the hypothesis that the treatment effects 
are not significantly different from zero.An F ratio of 4.336, with 
l 4 , 8 4  d e g r e e s  o f  f r e e d o m  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  a t  t h e  0 . 9 9 9  l e v e l . T h e  
l4 /-/' Ostle, Statistics in Research, p. 366. 
^^Saimxel Selby, ed., Stand^d Mathematical Tables (Cleveland, Ohio: 
The Chemical Rubber Compainy, 1968) , p. 592. 
j} 
See Appendix A for a matrix of simple correlation coefficients. 
ua 
' See Appendix B for the matrix of treatments and blocks. 
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hypothesis that the effects of the treatments is not significantly differ­
ent from zero cannot be accepted. 
Due to the relatively small correlation between average teacher 
salary and district size, a test was made to see if stratification by size 
class helped or harmed the explanatory power of the treatments. An esti­
mate of the experimental error mean square for a completely random design 
was compared to the experimental error mean square for the randomized com­
plete block design. A measure of relative efficiency of the two designs 
has been defined by Ostle as being the ratio of these two quantities. 
For the study the ratio of estimated experimental error mean square for 
the completely random design to the experimental error mean square of the 
randomized complete block design was 1.65. The addition of the blocks 
added to the efficiency of the design. 
Regionsil teacher salary variation is large enough in Iowa to warrant 
adjustment of per pupil cost to account for the variation. For the State 
as a whole, teacher salaries account for 63.65 percent of total general 
fund expenditures including federal funds. If federal funds are removed 
to find the percentage of state-local funding going to teacher salaries, 
this figure increases to 66.12 percent. 
As an example, let us assume two hypothetical schools, identical in 
all aspects except geographic location. School 1 is located in Area I6 
where teacher salaries are IO6.9 percent of the state average. School 2 
is in Area ih where teacher salaries are 92.5 percent of the state average. 
If both schools spend $920 per pupil and allocate 66.12 percent of this 
^^For a detailed explanation of the estimation of the completely 
random design experimental error, see Ostle, Statistics in Research, p. 375. 
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for teacher salaries, they spend approximately $6o8 per student to 
acquire teachers. In Area l6, however, teachers of equal quality should 
cost $87 per student more than in Area l4. If one assumes that higher 
salaries mean better teachers, the school in Area l4 is actually a higher 
quality school than the school in Area lU. 
School District Long Run Cost 
A minimum level of teachers and other resources are required to 
attain any educational outcome. This minimum level of resources repre­
sents a minimum "fixed capital" requirement necessary to provide an edu­
cational offering of given quality. In small districts, economies of 
scale in resource use are obvious. 
In Iowa, approximately 50 percent of all school districts have total 
enrollments of less than 750 students in average daily membership. Table 
4-3 shows the average per pupil cost and coefficient of variation for 
Table 1^-3 
Size Class and Per Pupil Expenditure^ 
Size Class 
1 2 3 h 5 6 7 
Per Pupil 
Expenditure $1,000.73 $923 $863 $836 $844 $819 $834 
Coefficient 
of Variation 12.35% 11.23% 10.86% 9.992 9.07% 11.21% 10.29% 
^From Iowa, Secretary's Annual Report, 1970-71. 
^Eenry M. Levin, "The Effect of Different Levels of Expenditure on 
Educational Output," in Economic Factors Affecting the Financing of Edu­
cation, ed. by Roe Johns, et al. (Gainesville, Florida: National Educa~ 
tional Finance Project, 1970), p. 192. 
each size class in the state. If one assumes homogeneous educational 
quality among districts, the cost per student tends to decline up through 
Size Class U, then level out as size class increases. These cost figures 
are averages over size class. The enrollment range of Size Class T, for 
example, is from 3,000 to around %^,000. In spite of the wider range of 
enrollments in the five larger categories, the standard deviation of 
average size class cost as a percent of the mean does not vary widely. 
The coefficient of variation reaches its minimum at Size Class 5 and tends 
to increase for 6 and 7 as cost per student levels off. A possible reason 
for the increased coefficient of variation would be diseconomies of scale 
in the larger schools, since both 6 and T cover large enrollment ranges. 
John Riew, in studying possible economies of scale in Wisconsin 
public high school operations using a regression model, estimated the 
T 8 
optimal size school to be around 1,700 students. While the difference 
between school and district mi^t cloud the issue some, it would seem 
that the optimum Iowa district, when categorized by size class, assuming 
homogeneous quality of output, would be a Size Class 6 district. The cost 
per student is relatively low, and the coefficient of variation is also 
low indicating a relatively homogeneous distribution of per pupil costs 
within the size class. Size Class 6 districts contain from 2,000 to 
2,999 students, and so, are slightly larger than Riew's optimal size 
category. This measure would be, however, a very weak indication of 
optimal size if used in absence of other supporting evidence. 
Riew's model of the long-run cost function of the high school 
^^John Riew, "Economies of Scale in Eigh School Operations," Review 
of Economics and Statistics, XLVIII (August, 1966), 285. 
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district is linear in all terms except enrollment. This entails an in^Jli-
cit assumption that all of his quality proxies are unrelated to size. The 
actual model he fitted was 
— 3- B2X2 ^2^2 ®3^3 ^ ByXy 
where 
= per pupil cost, 
Xg 5 enrollment, 
Xg 5 average teacher salary, 
= units offered, 
X^ = average courses taught per teacher, 
Xg = change in enrollment from 1957 to 196O, and 
Xy = percent of classrooms built after 1950. 
Variables X^, Xj^ and X5 are intended to proxy school quality. Vari­
able Xg was included to attempt to catch any long-run vs. short-run cost 
differences. X^ was included because per pupil cost figures for the data 
included building maintenance which could cause cost variation if older 
buildings are more expensive to keep up. 
His findings were that the six independent variables explained 
approximately 56 percent (R^ of 0.557, significant at O.98) of the per 
pupil cost variation. However, only teacher salaries, changes in enroll­
ment and enrollment were statistically significant. Removal of both 
2 2 
enrollment variables, Xg and X^, from the equation reduced the R to 0.37^, 
so enrollment variation "explained" approximately 18.3 percent of the cost 
variation. 
Signs of the estimated regression coefficients associated with the 
variables are all consistent with his hypothesis that economies of scale 
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exist. The actual equation for his sample of 109 districts is^^ 
=• 10.31 - O.kOZXg + 0.00012X2 O.lOTXg + 0.985%^ - 15.62X5 + 
0.6l3Xg - 0.102Xy . 
Overall, Riew concluded that the reorganization of small school districts 
into larger districts could result in a more efficient allocation of 
educational resources. 
Elchanan Cohn studied economies of scale in Iowa high school dis­
tricts. He used per pupil cost as a dependent variable and enrollment 
varients (ADA, ADA^, and ADA~^), school quality (as proxied by test 
scores), college hours per high school assignment, assignments per 
teacher, teachers' salaries, units offered, building value, bonded 
indebtedness and class size as independent variables. He was, with these 
o 
variables, able to attain R values in the 0.35 range using various com­
binations of linear and nonlinear equations. His attempts at explaining 
cost variation in Iowa high schools suggest the existence of significant 
economies of scale in the smaller districts. 
The estimated cost function which Cohn feels best fits the 1962-63 
Iowa data he used takes the form of 
C = a + bQ^^ + Zc^z^ 
with C being cost, the inverse of enrollment (the only enrollment 
variable included), c^ shadow prices and the cost and quality proxies. 
Like Riew, Cohn assumed a linear relation between cost and all variables 
^^Ibid., 284. 
^^Elchanan Cohn, "Economies of Scale in Iowa High School Operations," 
Journal of Human Resources, III (Fall, 1968), Û22-3U. 
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except enrollment. for this estimated cost equation was 0.377. 
In an attempt to find additional evidence of economies of scale in 
Iowa schools, the present study estimated cost functions based on 1970-71 
per pupil expenditure, net of federal funds. Table shows various 
estimated cost functions for the Iowa 1970-71 sample. Because the size-
cost relation was deemed important in the Eiew and Cohn studies, a random 
sample for the present study was drawn from the i+53 Iowa districts after 
stratifying them into the seven size class categories used by the Iowa 
Department of Public Instruction. Each stratum was weighted so that the 
proportion of the stratum in the sample was the same as the proportion of 
the stratum in the state. A random sample of 50 districts was then drawn. 
Per pupil expenditure net of federal aid was chosen as the dependent 
variable. Independent variables were chosen as follows: The total aver­
age daily membership^ of the district was chosen as an independent vari­
able intended to isolate economies of scale. To attempt to account for 
school district quality, average teacher salary, courses taught per teacher, 
and total units offered by the district were included. They were used to 
attempt to isolate teacher quality, degree of specialization of teachers 
and alternatives available to the student, respectively. 
-Stepwise regression vas used to attempt to fit the four models found 
in Table 4—4. The multiplicative model was a better fit for the sample 
data than either linear or semi-linear models. This indicates non-
linearity in the quality proxies as well as the existence of economies of 
scale. Model 4 takes the form 
^Average daily membership (ADM) is the sum of all pupils enrolled 
each day during the school year divided by the actual number of days 
taught. 
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Table U-U 
Regression Estimates of Cost Functions for a Stratified 
Random Sample of 50 Iowa School Districts®" 
Variables: 
Dependent: C = Cost per pupil 
Independent: = ADM 
Xg s Courses taught per teacher 
X3 = Units offered 
Xif, = Average teacher salary 
Functions : 
1. C = a + ^ 2.^1 ®3^3 SÎ4.XIJ, 
2. C = a + B^X^ + + Bg%_ + 
3. C = a + B^X^ + B^X^^ + BgXg + + Bj^Xj^ 
U. C = 
Function 
Estimates^ 
a % 1 Bl 32 
1 797 -0.0941 
(0.054) 
-9.0157 
(61.885) 
2 1,330 -0.6259 
(0.1376) 
0.0001 
(0.0000) 
-260.31 
(89.730) 
3 263 -0.2019 
(0.0471) 
197,723.4 
(37,466.0) 
-412.24 
(90.740) 
k 90.02 -0.7239 
(0.0986) 
-0.7192 
(0.1145) 
B3 B4 R2 F 
1 2.0378 
(3.595) 
0.0135 
(0.252) 
0.207 2.95 
2 5.U2 
(2.557) 
0.0063 
(0.0020) 
0.451 7.32 
3 12.46 
(3.434) 
0.0528 
(0.0213) 
0.515 9.34 
k 0.7562 
(0.1517) 
0.4751 
(0.1566) 
0.634 19.46 
^•Conçjuted from Iowa, Secretary's Annual Report, 1970-71» 
^Standard error of the B values is in parentheses. 
(1) C = 
The B^'s are partial cost elasticity coefficients defined as 
ac Y 
(2) e = —2— = i£_ . _ _ 
1 c 
1ÎÏ 
Solving (l) for the veilue of e , one attains 
-1 
B-i Bp B-3 BK 
Bi Bg Bg 2% ^ • 
Changing to discrete terms. 
aXi Xg-X^-X^ 
AX^C 
(5) AC ^  B . 
X 
The partial elasticity coefficient thus indicates the responsiveness of 
cost to the change of the variable in question, all other varialJes assumed 
constant. The X.'s are the independent cost variables defined in Table 
k-h. 
In Function Table the partial elasticity of cost with respect 
to district size, B^, takes the value of -0.7239- The negative relation 
indicates the existence of economies of scale if all quality proxies are 
held constant. This form of function will yield no minimum point for the 
long-run average total cost as far as size is concerned. The positive 
O 
coefficient associated with X^ in Function 2, Table indicates that the 
actual function mi^t have a minimum at an enrollment of slightly over 
3,100 pupils. This substantiates the distribution of the raw cost data 
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ff 
cited earlier. The difference between functions would be insignificant 
for the State of Iowa because of the predominance of small districts. 
The restrictive assumption of linearity in «1i variables except 
enrollment is not found in Function This allows for the existence of 
economies and diseconomies of scale in the quality proxies. This impli­
citly assumes that a minimum number of courses and teachers is required 
for any educational offering, and that beyond a certain level, increases 
in the number of courses or specialization of teachers may not yield 
increases in quality. 
Overall, if one assumes that quality can be held constant as size 
increases, the stratified sample of Iowa school districts would indicate 
economies of scale in Iowa school districts. A school district of 200, 
spending $920 per student would reduce its per pupil costs approximately 
$3.32 per student by enrolling another student. Over 50 percent of Iowa 
districts could.be in the range where per pupil costs decline signifi­
cantly for each incremental student since over 50 percent have enrollments 
of 750 or less. 
Function Table 4-b, is the "best" cost function for the sample 
data. One can interpret the partial elasticity coefficients of the quality 
proxies for this function as follows. Units per teacher, variable X^, was 
used to determine the extent to which teachers tended to be specialists or 
Size and Quality 
^For Function 2, Table h-k, = -0.6259 and = 0.0001. Since 
= B^ + 23^ , if = 0, then = 2B^X^. Solving for X^, 0.6259 = 
O.OOOIX^, X^ = 3129.5. 
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generaJLists with the asGunçtion being made that specialization implies 
higher quality. The coefficient had the expected sign but appeared to 
explain much more of the variance in cost than vas expected. Analysis of 
variance of the logarithmic regression equation used to estimate the 
coefficients for Function 4 yielded the results shoTO in Table U-5. There 
Table U-5 
Analysis of Variance of Cost for a Sample 
of 50 Iowa School Districts^ 
Source Degrees of Freedom Sum of Squares Mean Square F 
Regression I; 0.471% 0.1179 19.46 
Residual 0.2725 0.0061 
Value R^ ar2 F 
a 90.02 
B^/a -0.7239 0.2771 0.2771 53.19 
Bg/aBi -0.7192 0.3833 0.1062 39.43 
Bg/aB^Bg 0.7562 0.5588 0.1755 24.85 
B^/aB^BgBg 0.^751 0.6337 0.0749 9.202 
^rom Iowa, Secretary's Annual Report, 1970-71. 
exists a significant amount of colinearity among the independent variables. 
Simple correlation coefficients indicate that size and all the quality 
proxies are correlated. The simple correlation coefficients are = 
-0.80, = 0.90 and = 0.37.^ 
s 
See Appendix A for a matrix of single correlation coefficients. 
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Coefficient would indicate that school size and degree of generali­
zation are inversely related or that size and quality as proxied hy spe­
cialization are positively related. The relationship between units 
offered and size is positive as is the average teacher salary and size 
relation. These coefficients indicate the possibility of quality itself 
being a function of the size of the district. In spite of the strong 
relationship which exists between size and the quality proxies, the F 
values associated with each are large enough to indicate that the over­
all relationship indicated by Equation ^ is valid for the sançle data. 
The possibility that quality and size are positively related is 
reinforced when one looks at the simple correlations among the quality 
proxies in light of the relation between the quality proxies and district 
a 
size. The degree to which teachers tend to be generalists is negatively 
related to the units offered by a district. A simple correlation coef­
ficient Tgg of -O.675O indicates that as units offered increases, the 
degree of specialization also increases. Since units offered by a. district 
are strongly positively correlated with the size of the district, larger 
districts tend to have more specialized teachers. 
Generalists also would seem to get lower pay judging from the -0.3692 
value for A negative relation between the degree of generalization 
and average teacher salary, given the positive relation between district 
size and teacher salary, could be interpreted to mean that larger dis­
tricts have to pay more for the specialized teachers they utilize. 
The number of units offered by a district is positively related to 
jf 
See Appendix A for a matrix of single correlation coefficients. 
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teacher salary with a simple coefficient of = 0.3377- It is not 
possible to tell if the higher salary associated with a broader cur-
riciilulum is a result of specialization or of just having higher quality 
teachers in general. It seems reasonable to assume that specialization 
and higher quality teachers are closely related also and that higher 
teacher salaries for specialization inçlies higher quality teachers. 
Conclusion 
In general, it is impossible to conclude that size and quality of 
educational offering as proxied by curriculum breadth, specialization of 
teachers, and teacher salaries are independent enough to be able to assume 
that quality can be assumed constant as size varies. However, judging 
from simple correlations, it "seems likely that, over the range of schools 
investigated, size and school quality are related in a positive manner. 
From this, one could infer that the existence of economies of scale could 
be understated by a cost function of the type previously estimated. Since 
economies of scale tend to be the most important explanatory factor in the 
estimated cost function, this analysis leads to rejecting the hypothesis 
that economies of scale are not significant in determining per pupil cost 
variation. 
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CHAPTER V: ADJUSTI-ÎENTS TO ATTAIN 
COMPARABLE PER PUPIL COSTS 
To determine the extent to which economies of scale and regional cost 
variation influence the impact of grants in aid in the State of Iowa, a 
full state funding model was adjusted for regional teacher salary vari­
ation and economies of scale. Statistical evidence in Chapter U indicates 
that these two variables could cause variation in per pupil expenditure 
which is not compensated for by variation in quality of educational offer­
ing. Grants systems such as full state funding and percentage equalizaton 
which are usually offered as alternatives to foundation plans often have 
some sort of cost equalization aspect. This dollar cost equalization, 
when viewed in terms of reail inputs purchased could have a disequalizing 
rather than equalizing intact on equality of access to educational 
resources for the children of a state. 
As noted in Chapter 3, full state funding requires a statewide col­
lection and distribution of revenues. Because of the statewide levy a 
redistribution from hi^ to low assessed valuation districts results from 
this type of grant in aid. In Iowa, this redistribution is a redistribu­
tion from small schools to large schools. 
Full state funding requires that the state pay all educational costs 
incurred by the local district. Since the full cost of elementary and 
ff 
Except for costs of strictly local services such as community plays, 
etc., full state funding pays the entire per pupil expenditure. 
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secondary education is torne by the stats, the amount of aid ahove local 
tax collections or the amount of tax above district cost would not vary 
with adjustments of the per pupil cost figure to include regional cost 
variations or deflators for lack of economies of scale. A growth con­
straint was incorporated into the simulated full state funding model dis­
cussed in Chapter 3. It was noted that if either regional cost variation 
or economies of scale existed, the use of unadjusted cost figures in a 
growth constraint could cause horizontal inequity. In other words, dis­
tricts which should be receiving different treatment are receiving the 
same treatment. 
A full state funding model coupled with a growth constraint with 
expenditures adjusted for variations in the quantity and quality of real 
resources purchased could be used as a device to equalize educational 
opportunity. This could be much more equitable in a horizontal fashion 
than the equalization of unadjusted per pupil expenditures in that dis­
tricts in equal cost situations would be treated equally. 
Cost Adjustments 
With horizontal equity in mind the data used to simulate the full 
state funding model of Chapter 3 were modified in the following fashion. 
Teacher salaries account for 66.12 percent of the total per pupil cost for 
jf 
the State as a whole. For each district, 66.12 percent of the per pupil 
cost was adjusted for the average cost of obtaining teachers in that geo­
graphic area. This was done "by subtracting 66.12 percent from per pupil 
jff 
Figures on average cost of teachers in geographic regions were 
obtained from Table 4-1. 
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cost, multiplying it by the ratio of average teacher salary per merged 
area to state average teacher salary, and adding the adjusted teacher cost 
back into per pupil cost. The assumptions vera made that teacher quality 
is distributed homogeneously across the State and that higher salary bids 
will cause teachers to move within a geographic region but not out of the 
region. All other costs were assumed to vary in a homogeneous fashion 
among districts. 
To deflate per pupil expenditure for lack of economies of scale in 
the smaller districts, the relation between size class and per pupil 
jf 
expenditure was used. Average per pupil cost for each size class drops 
rapidly through Size Class U where a leveling trend begins. The assump­
tion is made that the average per pupil cost of the four largest size 
classes is a proxy for the optimal per pupil cost. Using this figure as 
a base, deflators of 1.2, 1.11 and 1.03 can be derived for Size Class 1, 
2 and 3 schools, respectively. 
Deflating regionally adjusted per pupil cost figures for each local 
district by these cost deflators yields an average adjusted per pupil cost 
of $800. This same data, unadjusted, yielded an average of $827 when the 
full state funding model was simulated in Chapter 3. 
Application of a 110 percent state average cost per pupil in ADM 
growth constraint was employed as in Chapter 3. The purpose is to attempt 
to equalize real educational expenditures rather than money educational 
expenditures. The adjustments for lack of economies of scale in the small 
districts and regional teacher salary variation are intended to provide 
M 
See Table 4-3 for this relation. 
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cost figures that are more representative of the real educational services 
provided. Table 5-1 contains the size class distribution of districts 
which vould be allowed per pupil cost increases under the adjusted cost 
full state funding model as well as the size class distribution from the 
unadjusted model of Chapter 3. It is apparent that Size Class 1 and 2 
Table 5-1 
Size Class Distribution of School Districts Allowed Per Pupil 
Cost Increase Under Full State Funding Using 
Adjusted and Unadjusted Data^ 
Size Class 
All 1 2 3 h 5 6 7 
Cost Adjusted 365 9h 89 59 k8 21 31 23 
Percent of 
Size Class 76.k 80.1 84.3 81.3 91.3 78.8 79.3 
Percent of 
Category- 100 25.7 2k.3 15.2 13.1 5.7 8.5 6.3 
Cost Unadjusted^ 306 kk 67 60 5% 21 35 25 
Percent of 
Size Class 35.8 60.k 85.7 91.5 91.3 92.1 86.2 
Percent of 
Category 100 Ik.4 21.9 19.6 17.6 11.It 11.4 8.2 
^Data from Iowa, Secretary's Annual .Report, 1970-71. 
Unadjusted figures obtained from Table 3-7. 
schools stand to benefit from adjustment for economies of scale. A total 
of 72 districts which were not allowed growth using unadjusted cost figures 
would be allowed growth using the adjusted cost figures. Cost adjustment 
reduces the variance of the distribution of percent of size class. The 
standard deviation of the distribution of percent of size class allowed 
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growth declines from 27.55 for the unadjusted data to 11.97 for the 
adjusted model. 
It is not possible to totally segretate the adjustment for regional 
teacher salary variation in the Size Class 1, 2 and 3 schools because it 
could either increase or decrease the per pupil cost of the district 
depending on the location of the district. Also, the adjustment for lack 
of economies of scale was so large in this group of schools that it would 
probably outweigh any upward cost revision due to low average teacher 
salary in the surrounding area. However, in the size classes where no 
adjustment was made for lack of economies of scale, a district could have 
its cost increased or decreased by this adjustment and segregation would 
be possible. Table 5-1 indicates that 12 schools of Size Class 4 through 
7 which were near the constraint were also in areas of generally low 
teacher salaries. There is no other way a school in this group could be 
disallowed growth. Schools in geographic areas of lower than average 
teacher salaries have their costs adjusted upward to reflect this fact. 
Summary 
This adjusted cost simulation of a full state funding model has 
limited objectives. It is intended to show that if educational resources 
are used to proxy equality of educational opportunity, a model which does 
not adjust for economies of scale and regional teacher salary variation 
yields substantially different results than one which does. Table 5-1 
shows this quite adequately by simulating the same model using both 
adjusted and unadjusted costs. 
The practical usefulness of adjustments of the type presented in 
on 
this chapter are limited by social goals and political feasibility. 
Maintenance of the status quo in access to educational resources is often 
deemed not satisfactory. If reform is to take the route of reorganizing 
school districts into more efficient size units, it will not be necessary 
to use a deflator to account for lack of economies of scale in small 
schools. In states such as Iowa where redistricting seems not to be 
feasible politically, such an adjustment is necessary to insure equal 
access to educational resources under any grants system which pushes 
toward equalization of dollar expenditures. 
Adjustment for regional teacher salary variation is necessary to get 
cost figures that are comparable across a wide geographic airea. Wot doing 
so could create a situation of geographic horizontal inequity in which 
schools in an entire region are treated differently than similar schools 
in a different region. 
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CHAPTER VI: SUI^^ÎARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Scarcity of economic resources is well illustrated "by the struggle 
to finance elementsiry and secondary education in America. Eduators have 
a seemingly endless, nobly justified demand for funds to better the edu­
cational opportunities of the children of a community. The members of a 
community who must supply the needed funds have a justified demand for 
measurable results of the educational process which they are purchasing. 
Local property taxes are currently the primary source of funds for 
the local school district. In the late 1960's, questions began to arise 
about the constitutionality of this system of educational finance. With 
taxable property as the main revenue base for local school districts, 
large variation in the ability of districts to generate revenue can arise. 
The constitutional question is based on the assertation that the variation 
in taxable property causes variation in educational expenditures. It is 
generally assumed that educational expenditures are directly related to 
educational opportunity and that the denial of equal educational opportu­
nity is unconstitutional. 
The first case in which this question was upheld was Serrano v. Priest 
in the State of California. The California Supreme Court ruled that the 
school finance system in California was in violation of both the California 
and United States Constitutions. In Texas, the U.S. District Court of the 
Western District of Texas held that the Texas system of financing education 
was in violation of the U.S. Constitution. The case was Rodriguez v. San 
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Antonio and was "based entirely on the Serrano v. Priest prededent. Gen­
erally, the rulings of these two courts were interpreted to mean that the 
quality of education received hy a child could not be functionally related 
to the wealth of the school district in which he resides. The U.S. Supreme 
Court reversed this decision and ruled that education is not a right pro­
tected by the U.S. Constitution. 
Concurrent with this push toward greater equality of educational 
opportunity was increasing strain on the willingness of the local tax­
payer to hear increasing tax burdens. As the taxes to finance schools 
increased, many schools had to shut down because of lack of funds caused 
by taxpayer revolt. The pressure on local taxpayers was quickly trans­
mitted to state legislatures. 
Educational finance was under pressure for change from two direc­
tions—the push for greater equality of opportunity and the push for lower 
taxes. In Iowa, the state legislature met these forces with a property 
tax freeze, educational spending limits to control taxes, and a foundation 
program to insure a minimum level of resources available for all districts. 
Reversal of Rodriguez v. San Antonio by the U.S. Supreme Court did 
not quell the pressure for either type of reform. The Serrano v. Priest 
case is still the "basis for much of the pressure to equalize educational 
opportunity. Expenditure per pupil and equality of educational opportun­
ity were implicitly equated by the California Supreme Court when it 
assumed that higher expenditures mean better schools. As a result, much 
of the proposed reform for equality of educational opportunity contains 
strong equalization of educational expenditure measures. 
This thesis studied three aspects of educational finance reform in 
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the State of Iowa. First, Iowa's system of school finance was analyzed 
to determine if it was subject to Serrano v. Priest type criticism. 
Second, the thesis studied the degree to which higher per pupil expendi­
tures are related to measures which, under reasonable assumptions, should 
indicate higher quality education. Third, the effect on the State of 
Iowa of school aid plans which conform to the letter of the Serrano v. 
Priest decision was studied. 
Findings 
Iowa's school aid law, House File 65^, is a foundation program of the 
type ruled unconstitutional in California. Should a case be brought 
against this law under the Iowa Constitution, the possibility exists it 
could he found unconstitutional. In addition, H.F. 65^ has four modifi­
cations dealing with spending constraints, guaranteed minimum aid, mis­
cellaneous income, and milla^e reductions, all of which could increase 
its susceptibility to this type of criticism. 
A review of the literature on educational input-output relations 
indicates a weak relationship "between expenditures and most measures of 
educational output. This is partly explained Tjy the high average cost 
found in small schools. Estimates of the long-run average cost for school 
districts in the State of Iowa indicate the existence of significant econ­
omies of scale occurring up to enrollments of around 2,000 students. 
These estimates assume quality of school inputs constant throughout the 
range. There is some evidence that the quality of real educational 
resources purchased actually increases in this range. This would tend to 
further aggravate the problems encountered when using educational 
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expenditures per pupil as a measure of educational opportunity. 
Teacher salaries show a substantial regional variation across the 
State of Iowa. If one assumes teacher quality is distributed throughout 
the state in a homogeneous fashion, and that teachers are mobile within 
but not among regions, equalization of educational expenditures could 
cause an allocation problem. Relatively too much money would be allocated 
to regions with low cost teachers and too little to areas with high cost 
teachers. 
Simulation of percentage equalizing and full state funding grant 
systems indicated that both systems tend to distribute relatively more aid 
to larger districts or if a growth constraint is used, both systems tend 
to constrain small districts. Those districts being taxed an amount 
greater than district cost under full state funding, and those districts 
receiving lower than average (possibly negative) aid under percentage 
equalizing plans were primarily small districts. Expenditure constraints, 
which are often proposed for "leveling up" educational expenditures, tend 
to constrain small districts more than large districts. 
Coupled with the evidence on teacher salary variation and economies 
of scale, implementation of either of these aid programs could be detri­
mental to small school districts in Iowa. Both programs comply to the 
letter of the Serrano v. Priest decision in that they do not make the 
amount of resources available a function of the wealth of the school dis­
trict. Because of the large number of small school districts in Iowa, the 
application of either plan could disequalize rather than equalize educa­
tional opportunity. A grant system which prescribes the same treatment 
for all school districts when in reality there are large differences among 
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districts will only intensify existing problems. 
Simulation of the full state funding model using data adjusted for 
lack of economies of scale in the smaller schools and for regional teacher 
salary variation yields quite different results than the unadjusted data. 
The bias against small schools is largely eliminated. The percent of 
schools not al 1 oved expenditure increases by the growth constraint shows 
no discernable relationship to the size of the district. 
Policy Implications 
When the California Supreme Court made its ruling in the Serrano v. 
Priest case, it was specifically dealing vrith a problem in California. 
Because of the acceptance of the Serrano v. Priest ruling across the 
nation, the implications of the case were far reaching. The particular 
economic-demographic structure of California could have made some aspects 
of the Serrano v. Priest case unique to California. To apply that same 
ruling to a state such as Iowa which has a different economic-demographic 
structure would yield questionable results. 
The California Supreme Court implicitly "based educational opportun­
ity on the money per pupil expenditures of the school district. In Iowa, 
money expenditures do not represent resil resources purchased because of 
the existence of economies of scale and regional teacher salary variation. 
This implies that if expenditures are to be used as a proxy for educational 
opportunity, they should be adjusted to account for cost variations due to 
economies of scale or resource price variation. 
A more general policy implication deals with one of the ever present 
problems in legislated economics; the problem of defining an adequate base 
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of comparison. Policy which attempts to treat all entities with the same 
legal definition in the same fsahion without looking at underlying dif­
ferences will only succeed in treating them differently. Any law which 
deals with a reallocation of resources among legal entities should have a 
broader base of comparison than the legal definition of those entities. 
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APPENDIX A: 
I4ATRIX OF SBIPLE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS^ 
Y 
%2 %3 X4 %5 4 V 
Y 1 
-0.4396 1 
^2 
0.3kb6 -0.8 1 
^3. 
-0.3562 0.9016 -0.6750 1 
Xl; -0.0806 0.3656 -0.3692 0.3787 1 
0.61+72 -0.5316 0.5390 -0.4i80 -0.0880 1 
-0.3469 0,9684 -0.6697 0.8716 0.3377 -0.4571 1 
0.4751 -0.7615 0.9059 -0.74825 -0.4845 0.5282 -0.6075 1 
X^ = Average daily membership 
Xg s Courses taught per teacher 
X^ 5 Units offered 
X^ = Average teacher salary 
X^ = Assessed valuation per student 
Y = Cost per student 
a, Computed from Iowa, Secretary's Annual Report, 1970-71. 
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APPEIIDIX B: 
ANALYSIS OF SEGIOKAL TEACHER SALAKY VARIATION: 
RAIIDOMIZED COJIPLETE BLOCK DESIGII 
Block^ 
Treatment"' 
1 2 3 h 5 6 7 9 10 
1 7.5U9 7,232 8,721 7,651 7,767 8,03k 7,k5k 9,673 6,7k9 
2 8,3^5 9,36$ 8,6UU 8,53k 8,95k 8,272 8,7k6 8,205 8,103 
3 8,728 8,390 8,07k 8,69k 8,551 8,339 7,638 8,U8o 6,k55 
1» 8,037 8,091 9,326 8,836 9,817 8,701 8,365 8,505 8,325 
5 9,055 8,65k 8,779 9,126 9,150 7,k88 8,201 8,393 7,k6T 
6 0,436 9,202 9,h2h 9,200 10,155 8,608 8,660 9,380 8,5k2 
7 8,165 9,015 10,031 9,100 8,kk5 8,985 0,6k3 10,316 9,611 
58,351 59,9^9 63,019 6l,lki 62,839 58,k27 57,kl6 62,952 55,252 
8,366 8,56k 9,002 8,73k 8,978 8,3k7 8,2kk 8,993 7,893 
treatments are merged areas. 
^Blocks are size classes. 
Blockb Treatment®" B. Y. . 
11 12 13 Ik 15 16 
^i* 
1 8,172 7,28U 7,121 6,k20 6,k96 7,636 113,959 7,597 
2 8,362 8,101 6,702 7,079 6,615 8,990 123,017 8,201 
3 8,617 7,570 7,690 8,295 8,232 8,307 112,120 7,k75 
k 9,28b 8,071 8,505 7,880 7,37k 8,233 127,290 8,k86 
5 8,8k9 8,503 8,085 8,623 8,lk8 9,528 1,208,069 8,537 
6 8,556 8,910 8,020 7,86k 9,288 8,591 132,836 8,856 
7 9,529 8,977 8,15k 8,62k 9.15k 10,763 137,512 9,167 
61,369 57,707 5k,277 5k,785 55,307 62,ok8 
Y.. 
8,k27 
"•J 8,767 8,202 7,75k 7,826 7,915 8,86k 
1 
88k,803 
£y|j = T,527,031» ,000 
MYY = 7,^55,965,000 M = 7,^55,965,000 n, = H.3357 
BYY = 23,527,^20 B = 3,921,237 ' 
TYY = 19,9^+3,^20 T = l,lt2U,530 Significant at 0.995 
EYY = 27,598,8^0 E = 328,558 
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